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INTRODUCTION

Employee misconduct has become a fundamental concern for
most private employers in recent years. According to one estimate,
American business is currently losing between $12 billion and $40
billion annually to internal employee crime.' Increased on-the-job
use of alcohol and drugs is seriously undermining occupational
safety and production efficiency. 2 In response to these problems,
employers have significantly expanded utilization of such security
techniques as employee interrogation, lie detector tests, searches of
workers and their effects, and electronic surveillance of in-plant
activities. 3 These efforts have inevitably encroached upon the priI Johnson, How Many Criminals Do You Employ?, INDUSTRY WEEK, Sept. 22, 1975, at 23
(annual business losses due to crime estimated at between $15 billion and $50 billion, 80%
of which result from internal employee crime). One observer estimates that "70% of all
workers steal something from their employers." Note, The Working Man's Nemesis-The Polygraph, 6 N.C. CENT. L.J. 94, 100 (1974).
'See, e.g., D. MARTINDALE & E. MARTINDALE, THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF MENTAL
ILLNESS, ALCHOHOLISM [sic], AND DRUG DEPENDENCE

221-22 (1971). See also id. at 218-20,

262-66.
' Industry expenditures for electronic security systems alone, which totaled $275 million in 1974, may reach $791 million by 1984. Johnson, supra note 1, at 27.
Although this Article directly considers the impact of increased security techniques
only upon present employees, the pernicious effect of such practices upon job applicants
should also be recognized. "Prospective employees . . . increasingly are finding that employment is conditioned upon their submission to polygraph and psychological testing."
Hermann, Privacy, the Prospective Employee, and Employment Testing: The Need to Restrict Polygraph and Personality Testing, 47 WASH. L. REV. 73, 73 (1971). See also Loftus, Employer's Duty
to Know Deficiencies of Emplo)yees, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 143 (1967); Quindlen, Polygraph
Testsfor Jobs: Truth and Consequences, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1977, at BI, col. 1.
Pre-employment screening frequently involves expansive inquiry into at least four
areas:
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vacy of employees, 4 who find themselves increasingly subject to
5
Orwellian regimens in their places of employment.
Although employer security measures frequently conflict
with interests akin to constitutional rights, the absence of state
involvement effectively precludes judicial intervention 6 in most

[F]irst, questions about past dishonesty or criminal activity, detected or undetected, related or unrelated to work; second, questions about past work record
and attitude toward the job for which application is being made, and underlying
motives of the person seeking employment; third, questions about mental or physical problems, or about family difficulties which may affect work activity; and
fourth, questions about accident experiences, personal habits, political activity, and
personal association, any of which may be tangentially related to the likelihood of
accident or indicate personal instability.
Hermann, supra at 82-83 (footnotes omitted). See Note, Lie Detectors in PrivateEmployment: A
Proposalfor BalancingInterests, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 932, 936-37 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Lie Detectors in Private Employment]; Comment, The Polygraph and Pre-Employment
Screening, 13 Hous. L. REV. 551 (1976); Note, supra note 1, at 99-100. See also S. TERKEL,
WORKING 206-08 (Avon Books paper ed. 1975).
Although non-employee job applicants are technically not covered by the mandatory
collective bargaining obligations contained in the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (1970)), several employers and labor organizations have recently
negotiated agreements providing some protection for such individuals. See A. LEMOND &
R. FRY, No PLACE TO HIDE 124-25 (1975).

4 For a description of the various lie detection devices currently in use or under development, see notes 119, 126-29 and accompanying text infra. For a description of the
sophisticated surveillance equipment currently available, see notes 264-69 and accompanying text infra. See generally M. BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 61-174 (1964); S. DASH,
THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 69-89, 4501-52 (1967).
5 See G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949).

There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any
given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on
any individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched
everybody all the time. But at any rate 'they could plug into your wire whenever
they wanted to. You had to live-did live, from habit that became instinct-in the
assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness,
every movement scrutinized.
Id. at 4. See also A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 59.
6 In recent years, organized labor has frequently argued for the extension to the employment setting of basic constitutional protections against unreasonable searches (see U.S.
CONST. amend. IV), compelled self-incrimination (see U.S. CONST. amend. V), and denial of
counsel (see U.S. CONST. amend VI). See, e.g., Spelfogel, Surveillance and Interrogation in
Plant Theft and Discipline Cases, N.Y.U. 21ST ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 171, 172 (1969). Such
an approach would impose upon arbitration proceedings all of the rules applicable to criminal trials. Arbitrators would be forced to exclude probative evidence if an employer failed
to comply with technical constitutional requirements. The principles behind those requirements are certainly worthy of consideration by arbitrators. Strict adherence to those principles, however, is inappropriate in the relatively informal arbitration setting, where the
primary goal is to ascertain the truth.
Some writers have argued that corporate entities should be subject to constitutional
limitations since they are primarily creations of the states. See Berle, Constitutional Limita-
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cases.7 Thus, workers who desire to challenge the reasonableness
of particular searches or interrogations often resort to the arbitration process. 8 A substantial body of arbitration case law has
resulted from such disputes, to the point that there are now general areas of agreement among arbitrators as to the propriety of
various security measures. This Article analyzes the arbitration
process in the area of industrial security, and canvasses arbitration decisions dealing with each of the major security techniques
used by employers today. It also examines federal statutes that
proscribe certain employer security measures, including the National Labor Relations Act 9 and the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968.10 Throughout the Article, specific standards are suggested for rules governing the inquisitorial process
in private employment.
I
THE ARBITRATION PROCESS

Most collective bargaining agreements provide for grievance
procedures whereby employees can assert complaints against particular management acts or practices. 1 In most cases the grievance
process will terminate in arbitration-a form of hearing in which
management and labor submit their disputes to a neutral third
party (the "arbitrator") for adjudication.' 2 The arbitration process
tions on Corporate Activity-Protection of PersonalRights From Invasion Through Economic Power,
100 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1952); Hermann, supra note 3, at 140-49. Cf. Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946) (corporation may not deny constitutional freedoms in company-owned
town). However, courts have generally refused to utilize this idea. See, e.g., Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972). See also Wellington, The Constitution, The Labor
Union, and "GovernmentalAction," 70 YALE L.J. 345, 348 (1961).
For more extensive discussion of constitutional limitations in the arbitration process,
see notes 46-65 and accompanying text infra (fifth amendment applicability), and notes
199-242 and accompanying text infra (fourth amendment applicability).
7 Intervention by courts or administrative agencies may occur in the limited number of
cases in which employer security measures violate provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)), or the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). See generally
notes 35-45, 277-308 and accompanying text infra.
8 See notes 11-25 and accompanying text infra.
9 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
10 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
11 R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

540 (1976).
121d. at 541-42.
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is not a formal trial,' 3 although fundamental rules of procedural
due process are normally followed.' 4 The arbitrator deals "not so
much with legal rights as with equitable considerations and matters
of policy."' 5
Arbitration of disputes over employer security techniques thus
involves not the rigid application of statutory and constitutional
rules' 6 -although such rules may provide useful guidance' 7 but
the balancing of employer interests in industrial efficiency against
employee interests in privacy and personal dignity.' 8 It is generally
recognized that employers are "permitted by law and by contract to
make such rules and regulations as are not inconsistent with the
parties' collective bargaining agreement, and which are reasonably
necessary for the smooth, efficient conduct of the business--even
though at times they may impinge on the employee's personal
privacy."'19 Nevertheless, some management practices inevitably be20
come so intrusive as to offend contemporary standards.
13 R. GORMAN, supra note 11, at 543. As described by one arbitrator, "[t]he arbitration
process is (or should be) a search for truth." John Deere Waterloo Tractor Works, 20 Lab.
Arb. 583, 584 (1953) (Davey, Arb.).
14See generally Barbash, Due Process and Individual Rights in Arbitration, N.Y.U. 17TH
ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 7 (1964); Carlson & Phillips, Due Process Considerationsin Grievance
Arbitration Proceedings, 2 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 519 (1975); Edwards, Due Process Consideralions in Labor Arbitration, 25 ARB. J. 141 (1970); Stone, Due Process in Labor Arbitration,
N.Y.U. 24TH ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 11 (1972).

15 Stone, supra note 14, at 11 (emphasis in original). "[Tihe primary concern of the
arbitrator in his procedural and substantive rulings is not adherence to rules as such, but
advancement of what he believes to be good labor relations policy, and making a decision
the parties can live with." Id. at 16.
16 The rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings are not strictly followed in
the arbitral context. See Fleming, Some Problems of Evidence Before the Labor Arbitrator, 60
MICH. L. REV. 133 (1961); Jones, Evidentiary Concepts in Labor Arbitration:Some Modern Variations on Ancient Legal Themes, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1241, 1242-45 (1966). This does not
mean that arbitrators eschew all evidentiary doctrines. The late Professor Shulman best
summarized the basic philosophy of most arbitrators: "The more serious danger is not that
the arbitrator will hear too much irrelevancy, but rather that he will not hear enough of
the relevant." Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999,
1017 (1955). See also Jones, supra at 1253-56.
7See note 6 supra.
18See Edwards, supra note 14, at 169. "1 do not know whether an accommodation
between management's need to know what is going on in the plant and the workers' right
to privacy and dignity can be reached, but everyone involved in labor relations will find
these types of conflicts occurring more frequently as science advances." Burkey, Employee
Surveillance: Are There Civil Rights for the Man on the Job?, N.Y.U. 21ST ANN. CONF. ON
LABOR 199, 210 (1969).
19Scheiber, Tests and Questionnaires in the Labor-Management Relationship, 20 LAB. L.J.
695, 697 (1969).
The right to privacy holds tenaciously to life. It is a vulnerable right, con20
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Accommodation of conflicting interests in this area may require consideration of matters beyond the facts of a particular case.
A seemingly reasonable invasion of employee privacy, when viewed
in the light of many other intrusions by the same employer, may
2
point to a cumulative intrusive impact that is clearly unreasonable. '
On the other hand, the human rights concerns of individual employees must often be weighed against the job security of all employees. Since employee defalcations precipitate approximately
one-third of all business failures,2 2 the imposition of excessively
rigid restrictions on security measures can lead to unemployment
for wholly innocent workers.
The arbitration process faces several obstacles in attempting to
deal with these issues on a national basis. First, arbitration is almost
exclusively the creature of collective bargaining agreements, and is
ordinarily not available to nonunion employees. 23 Employees not
protected by contractual limitations may generally be disciplined or
discharged "for good cause, or bad cause, or no cause at all," unless
such action by the employer contravenes some specific statutory
proscription. 24 Second, arbitration decisions have no binding impact beyond the particular case decided. 25 Although arbitrators do
find considerable persuasive authority in the decisions of their
stantly imperiled by the forces of our crowded, technological society. Yet, the right
to privacy is essential to the American way of life, for it helps to prevent the
individual from being transformed into an Orwellian robot whose life is incessantly monitored so that he will function in conformance with the demands of an
impersonal society.
Courtney, Electronic Eavesdropping, Wiretapping and Your Right to Privacy, 26 FED. CoM. B.J.
1, 58 (1973).
The intrusiveness of particular security measures is not simply a function of technological development. "[1It is a well-worn clichE that machines are morally neutral, and it is
only the men who use them who therefore bear the responsibility for distinguishing between right and wrong." A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 23 (1971).
22

21 See

A. MILLER, supra note 20, at 207.
Spelfogel, supra note 6, at 171.

23

"Less than a third of unorganized employers provide any grievance machinery, and

arbitration as a terminal point for such grievance machinery is so unusual that its presence
is regarded as indeed a freak." Weyand, Present Status of Individual Employee Rights, N.Y.U.
22ND ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 171, 185 (1970).
24
Id. at 175. But see Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 519-24 (1976) (unorganized employees should be statutorily

provided with grievance-arbitration protection similar to that generally enjoyed by unionized workers).
25 F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 373 (3d. ed. 1973). Neverthe-

less, some arbitration decisions may establish plant-wide or company-wide precedent. See
id. at 374.
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brethren, they are not bound to follow particular precedents. Despite these limitations, the arbitration process has provided the
only major forum for weighing employer and employee interests in
the security area, and has developed an analytical frameworkadaptable in almost every employment context-for dealing with
each of the major security techniques in use today.
II
INTERROGATION

A.

FundamentalObligation of Emplo.yees To Answer
Employer Questions

Employees occupying special positions of trust with regard to
security matters are generally obliged to provide all pertinent information sought by their master. Thus, an individual employed as
a plant guard may properly be disciplined if he refuses, in response to employer inquiries, to supply information regarding inappropriate conduct by rank-and-file workers. 26 Similarly, an
employee who is paid by his company to divulge information pertaining to internal thefts may be punished if he declines to identify
discovered thieves, even where disclosure might subject the informant to personal danger.2 7 Even if not specially involved in security matters, however, workers must normally supply information
properly sought by their employer pursuant to a reasonable inves29
tigation of thefts 28 or other instances of employee misconduct.
Furthermore, the mere fact that a worker finds it distasteful to
inform on a fellow employee does not excuse a refusal to coop26

See e.g., Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 27 Lab. Arb. 709 (1956) (Maggs, Arb.).
27See Eisen Mercantile, Inc., 58 Lab. Arb. 340 (1972) (Madden, Arb.). But cf. Illinois
Bell Tel. Co., 63 Lab. Arb. 968, 979 (1974) (Dolnick, Arb.) (employee obliged to cooperate
with company orders provided no danger to his health or safety involved). It has also been
recognized that a storekeeper entrusted with the responsibility of requisitioning company
supplies may be discharged for failing to inform his master immediately about employee
depredations of which he has knowledge. C & P Tel. Co., 51 Lab. Arb. 457 (1968) (Seibel,
Arb.).
28 "Where an employer has suffered a loss by reason of theft, it has the right to make
a reasonable investigation, and its employees have the obligation to cooperate in that investigation. For an employee to refuse to answer questions would constitute insubordination."
Skaggs-Stone, Inc., 40 Lab. Arb. 1273, 1279 (1963) (Koven, Arb.). See Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 441, 443 (1968) (Koven, Arb.); Simoniz Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 658, 663
(1964)
(McGury, Arb.).
29
See, e.g., Olin Corp., 63 Lab. Arb. 952, 956-57 (1974) (Martin, Arb.).
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erate. 30 Arbitrators have even upheld the discipline of an employee
who failed to cooperate fully in an investigation at least partially
intended to implicate the interviewee himself.3 1 Moreover, in determining what relief to grant to a wronged grievant, some arbitrators may adversely consider the grievant's failure to cooperate in
32
reasonable employer investigations.
Employers do not, however, have carte blanche to question
employees on all subjects. Arbitrators should be careful to recognize that a company has the right to require employee cooperation
only with respect to matters clearly relevant to the employeremployee relationship. 3 3 In addition to this fundamental restriction
upon an employer's investigative prerogative, 34 other legal and
contractual limitations must be considered.
B.

Limitations on Employer Interrogation

1. Coercive Questioning Under the National Labor Relations Act
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)3 5 guarantees employees "the right to self-organization, to form, join,
30See Simoniz Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 658 (1964) (McGury, Arb.):
The grievant may have acted as he did to avoid being an informer. This again
is a human and understandable motive, but it is also inconsistent with his status as
a trusted employee. The assumed desire not to help convict a fellow-employee of
wrongdoing, which had already adversely affected all concerned, is not to be given
precedence over the grievant's duty to his employer who was not guilty of wrongdoing and who was making a legitimate and necessary inquiry.
Id. at 663. See also note 47 infra.
31See, e.g., General Tire & Rubber Co. (1956) (Wallen, Arb.) (unreported), discussed in
Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, THE ARBITRATOR AND THE PARTIES 1, 20 & n.20 (1958)
(Proceedings of the 11 th Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators). See also
Foote Bros. Gear & Mach. Corp., 13 Lab. Arb. 848, 859 (1949) (Larkin, Arb.). See notes
46-65 and accompanying text infra regarding the applicability of self-incrimination principles in the employment environment.
32See, e.g., Timex Corp., 63 Lab. Arb. 20, 23 (1974) (Woodward, Arb.); Bro-Dart
Stacey's, 62 Lab. Arb. 330, 333 (1973) (Modjeska, Arb.); Hawaiian Tel. Co., 43 Lab. Arb.
1218, 1225 (1964) (Tsukiyama, Arb.). See note 65 infra regarding the propriety of this
practice.
33See South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 59 Lab. Arb. 134, 139-40 (1972) (Seward, Arb.). See
also Rexall Drug Co., 65 Lab. Arb. 1101, 1103-04 (1975) (Cohen, Arb.); Thrifty Drug
Stores Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 1253, 1262-63 (1968) (Jones, Arb.).
34The requirement that questioning be business-related does not mean that employers
must have a reasonable belief that an employee possesses information relevant to suspected
misconduct before they may interrogate that employee. An employer should be able to
make general inquiries of its employees on company matters without being required to
show grounds for suspicion in each case.
35 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

1977]

INQUISITORIAL PROCESS IN EMPLOYMENT

or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection. '36 The Act prohibits employers from
engaging in any conduct that restrains or coerces employees in the
exercise of these rights.3 7 Violations of the NLRA therefore arise
when management officials question workers about protected
activities, 38 except in those instances where the inquiry is either
clearly innocuous 9 or is part of an ordinary response to a conversation initiated by the employee. 40 Similarly, management questions regarding the union sympathies of workers are generally
41
precluded.
In certain limited and exceptional circumstances, however,
employers may permissibly ask employees about matters that
fall within the purview of section 7. When a labor organization
asserts that a majority of the workers in an appropriate bargaining unit has designated it as the desired bargaining agent and requests that the company voluntarily extend recognition to it,
the employer may poll its employees 42 to verify the union's
36

1d. § 157 (1970).
37 Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970)) provides: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer--(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 .... "
in the
38
See, e.g., Springfield Dodge, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 1429, 89 L.R.R.M. 1736 (1975); Phillips Indus., Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 2119, 69 L.R.R.M. 1194 (1968), enforced sub nom. Clarke v.
NLRB, 410 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1969); Cain's Coffee Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 819, 67 L.R.R.M.
1278, enforced in relevantpart, 404 F.2d 1172 (10th Cir. 1968). It is also an unfair labor practice for an employer to question employees about the protected activities of other workers.
See generally C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 100-104 (1971).

39 See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Footwear Co., 201 N.L.R.B. 353, 82 L.R.R.M. 1262 (1973);
Meat Cleaver, 200 N.L.R.B. 960, 963, 82 L.R.R.M. 1054, 1055 (1972), elforced, 492 F.2d
1189 (9th Cir. 1974); Sandy's Stores, Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. 728, 65 L.R.R.M. 1034 (1967),
enforcement denied on other grounds, 398 F.2d 268 (Ist Cir. 1968). But see Monarch Foundry
Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 377, 32 L.R.R.M. 1457 (1953).
40 See Trial Examiner's decision in Campbell Soup Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 1547, 68
L.R.R.M. 1036 (1968). See generally Note, Employer Interrogationof Employees Concerning Their
Union Activities, 38 CONN. B.J. 189 (1964); Note, Interrogationof Employees Concerning Union
Matters as an Unfair Labor Practice, 3 DUKE B.J. 113 (1952); Note, Interrogationof Employees as
an Unfair LaborPractice, 62 YALE L.J. 1258 (1953).
41 See, e.g., Erie Tech. Prods., Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 878, 89 L.R.R.M. 1797 (1975); Sewell,
Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 325, 84 L.R.R.M. 1453 (1973); Reeves-Wiedeman Co., 203 N.L.R.B.
850, 83 L.R.R.M. 1240 (1973). See generally 65 W. VA. L. REV. 181 (1963).
42 Alternatively, the employer may do nothing when faced with such a recognition
demand, thereby forcing the labor organization to petition the Labor Board for a secretballot representation election. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S.
301, 310 (1974). On the other hand, if an employer elects to utilize independent means,
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claim.4 3 Also, to prepare a defense to an unfair labor practice
complaint, an employer may interrogate employees pursuant to
its investigation of the relevant facts, provided it complies with
44
the strict safeguards required by the Labor Board.
Although these limitations and exceptions are important, they
are applicable only in those cases involving the potential invasion of

such as an objective poll, to verify the union's assertion of majority support, it may thereby
obligate itself to extend voluntary recognition to the union if the evidence clearly establishes the truth of the union's claim. See, e.g., Sullivan Elec. Co., 199 N.L.R.B. 809, 81
L.R.R.M. 1313 (1972), enforced, 479 F.2d 1270 (6th Cir. 1973); Pacific Abrasive Supply Co.,
182 N.L.R.B. 329, 74 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1970); Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709, 49 L.R.R.M.
1228 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962). Cf Linden Lumber Div., Summer &
Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 310 n.10 (1974) (Court does not reach question of whether
union has burden of asking for election upon employer's refusal to recognize union's majority where employer breaches agreement to determine majority status by means other
than a Board election).
4' Note, however, that the National Labor Relations Board requires strict adherence to
specific rules to ensure the full protection of employee rights.
Absent unusual circumstances, the polling of employees by an employer will
be violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act unless the following safeguards are observed: (1) the purpose of the poll is to determine the truth of a union's claim of
majority, (2) this purpose is communicated to the employees, (3) assurances
against reprisal are given, (4) the employees are polled by secret ballot, and (5) the
employer has not engaged in unfair labor practices or otherwise created a coercive
atmosphere.
Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1063, 65 L.R.R.M. 1385, 1386 (1967). See
Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 614, 625-26, 84 L.R.R.M. 1582, 1583 (1973),
enforced, 503 F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1974). See also Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 591,
34 L.R.R.M. 1384 (1954).
44 [T]he employer must communicate to the employee the purpose of the questioning, assure him that no reprisal will take place, and obtain his participation on
a voluntary basis; the questioning must occur in a context free from employer
hostility to union organization and must not be itself coercive in nature; and the
questions must not exceed the necessities of the legitimate purpose by prying into
other union matters, eliciting information concerning an employee's subjective
state of mind, or otherwise interfering with the statutory rights of employees.
Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 770, 775, 55 L.R.R.M. 1403, 1406 (1964), enforcement
denied on other grounds, 344 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1965). See also UAW v. NLRB, 392 F.2d 801,
809 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906 (1968); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB,
377 F.2d 452, 455-56 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Neuhoff Bros. Packers, 375 F.2d 372,
377-78 (5th Cir. 1967). An employee has a protected right to refrain from voluntarily
providing evidence against a fellow employee in an unfair labor practice proceeding. See
Retail Store Employees Local 876, 219 N.L.R.B. 1188, 90 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1975).
Preparatory questioning of employees is frequently conducted by the company's attorney, who must exercise great care to avoid the imposition of vicarious unfair labor practice
liability on his client. It is possible for the attorney to minimize unnecessary exposure by
preparing a written affidavit specifically describing the required safeguards. The affidavit
can then be read to and by the prospective interviewee and executed by that person before
a notary public.
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section 7 rights.45 Since most employee interrogations relate to
theft or misconduct rather than union organizational activity, the
NLRA restrictions are normally not applicable to security interviews.
2.

Applicability of Self-Incrimination Principles

The fifth amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. ' 46 Although employment disciplinary matters are technically not "criminal cases," many arbitrators have concluded that the basic policies
enunciated in the self-incrimination clause are at least partially applicable to the employment setting. 47 Fifth amendment considerations bear on two separate issues that recur in arbitration: the
admissibility of employee confessions and the consequences of a
worker's refusal to answer employer questions.
a. Admissibility of Employee Confessions. Employment security
interviews can be very uncomfortable experiences even for workers
who have not participated in any misconduct. The slightest insinuation that the interviewee is suspected of wrongdoing can precipitate substantial apprehension. Under such circumstances, it is quite
possible that a wholly innocent employee will expressly or impliedly
indicate culpability in an effort to appear cooperative to management inquisitors who control his employment destiny. For this
45 Where a worker has been disciplined for refusing to answer questions about activity
protected under the NLRA, an arbitrator should refuse to sustain the penalty due to an
absence of 'just cause." This is one instance in which the collective bargaining contract
must be interpreted in concert with the fundamental policies enunciated in the Labor Act.
Otherwise the matter would simply have to be relitigated before the Labor Board to the
obvious detriment of all concerned. See Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 989, 91
L.R.R.M. 1116 (1975); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
It should be noted, however, that the NLRB will no longer defer § 8(a)(1) unfair labor
practice charges to the arbitration process, if the underlying issue was not resolved there
in the first instance. See General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 94 L.R.R.M.
1483 (March 16, 1977) (overruling National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 80 L.R.R.M.
1718 (1972)). See also Texaco, Inc., 95 L.R.R.M. 1533 (1977) (advice memorandum of
NLRB Genral Counsel).
46 U.S. CONST. amend. V. Regarding the historical development of the self-incrimination privilege and its relatively broad scope, see MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE 243-363 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). Compare Goldberg, Can We Afford Liberty?, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 665 (1969), with
Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L.
REv. 671 (1968).
47 Since the privilege only relates to self-incrimination, a wholly innocent employee
would not have the right to rely upon it for the purpose of protecting other workers from
the incrimination that might result from his statements.
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reason, arbitrators will not accord probative value to all "admis48
sions" obtained during such interrogations.
When a voluntary confession is offered as evidence, the weight
accorded to it should be assessed in light of the circumstances
under which it was obtained. 49 If there is any indication that the
"confession" was obtained by inducements or threats, it will receive
no evidentiary weight. 50 Similarly, if the surrounding circumstances were such as to induce inordinate anxiety in the worker's
mind, arbitrators will normally give little, if any, credence to an
admission. 5 1 However, if an employee makes an admission in response to employer questioning that involved no improper inducements or unreasonable intimidation, the arbitrator should accord due deference to the disclosure.
Since a worker would not ordinarily contest the admissibility of
a truly voluntary confession,5 2 a challenge to an admission should
alert the arbitrator to possible undue influence or coercion. This
problem is particularly acute where the confession constitutes the
sole evidence of the employee's guilt. Nonetheless, as long as the
arbitrator is convinced that the statement was willingly provided
and is entirely credible, he may consider it sufficient in itself to
53
support a finding of culpability.
[Tjhe concern of the arbitrator with respect to the proffer of "confession" evidence, elicited unilaterally in a pre-grievance interrogation, should focus on its reliability, and, in egregious circumstances, on its allowability in terms of fair play
and reasonable privacy. Generally, emotional strain created by accusation and the
latent fear of the power of an employer to institute criminal prosecution irrespective of guilt or innocence, render this kind of evidence unreliable.
Jones, supra note 16, at 1295.
49 Safeway Stores, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. 1195, 1202 (1971) (Jacobs, Arb.).
50 See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. 29 Lab. Arb. 272, 277 (1957) (Babb, Arb.);
Kroger Co., 12 Lab. Arb. 1065, 1067 (1949) (Blair, Arb.).
"'See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. 1195, 1203-04 (1971) (Jacobs, Arb.);
Thrifty Drug Stores Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 1253, 1262 (1968) (Jones, Arb.). See also Union
Tank Car Co., 49 Lab. Arb. 383 (1967) (Crawford, Arb.). One arbitrator has indicated,
however, that he does "not subscribe to the doctrine that purity must always envelop those
engaged in attempting to ascertain the truth, or that subterfuge or pretence is always improper in a truth-seeking endeavor." Weirton Steel Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 103, 105 (1968)
(Kates, Arb.).
52 The employee may, of course, challenge the propriety of the discipline imposed for
the admitted misconduct; this issue, however, is fundamentally different from the question
of guilt.
" Cf. Lucky Stores, Inc., 53 Lab. Arb. 1274 (1969) (Eaton, Arb.) (employees properly
discharged where no credible evidence contradicted their confessions, no showing of coercion made, and circumstantial evidence supported their statements). But see Safeway Stores,
Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. 1195, 1203 (1971) (Jacobs, Arb.); Weirton Steel Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 103,
106 (1968) (Kates, Arb.).
48
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b. Effect of Employee Refusal To Answer Questions. When an em-

ployee refuses to respond to management inquiries concerning
alleged misconduct, arbitrators generally will not allow the employee's silence to be used as evidence of his guilt. 54 This is true

even if the employer presents independent evidence of the
worker's culpability. In general, the employer has the burden of
establishing 'just cause" in disciplinary cases by demonstrating to
11 In the criminal context, a defendant's refusal to answer police questions is rarely
given probative value at trial. This avoids the possibility of offending the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); United States
v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975). In the private employment setting, however, the constitutional restrictions applicable to governmental conduct have no binding effect. Although
arbitrators may consider relevant fifth amendment principles when resolving disputes, they
are not ordinarily obligated to do so. See Lucky Stores, Inc., 53 Lab. Arb. 1274, 1276
(1969) (Eaton, Arb.); Weirton Steel Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 103, 105-06 (1968) (Kates, Arb.);
Simoniz Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 658, 662-63 (1964) (McGury, Arb.); Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 27
Lab. Arb. 709, 712-13 (1956) (Maggs, Arb.). But cf. Anchor Hocking Corp., 66 Lab. Arb.
480, 480 (1976) (Emerson, Arb.) (employee's discharge for stealing resulting from lunchbox search not permitted where employer did not give "Miranda" warnings). See generally
R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 181-82 (1965); Scheiber, supra note 19, at
701. However, the possibility that a state statute might expressly require the application of
some constitutional principles to private arbitration proceedings should not be ignored. See,
e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 910 (West 1966); see also Jones, supra note 16, at 1255 n.41.
Some commentators have urged caution in applying constitutional standards in the
arbitral arena.
[T]here is undeniably a fundamental distinction between a criminal prosecution
and an arbitration proceeding. Because our society has seen fit to require that
every possible protection be extended to those accused of crime in order to insure
that no one will be deprived of his liberty unjustly, it does not follow that an
employee is entitled to protection in the same degree for the purpose of determining whether he is to be subjected to job discipline or even deprived of his job.
Notwithstanding frequent resort to the euphemism, "economic capital punishment," . . . incarceration is punishment of greater severity than loss of work and
its concomitant effects.
THE ARBITRATOR AND THE PARTIES 39-40 (1958) (Proceedings of the 11 th Annual Meeting
of the National Academy of Arbitrators) (discussion by A. Stockman). See Silard, Rights of
the Accused Employee in Company Disciplinary Investigations, N.Y.U. 22ND ANN. CONF. ON LABOR
217, 218 (1970).
A few authorities have suggested that management inquisitors be required to provide
pre-interrogation ("Miranda") warnings concerning an employee's "right" to remain silent.
See Anchor Hocking Corp., 66 Lab. Arb. 480 (1976); Silard, supra at 224-25. See generally
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Such warnings are not constitutionally required,
however, and seem inappropriate in dealings between private parties. See In re Rosengart,
9 Misc. 2d 174, 169 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. 1957), aff'd mem., 6 App. Div. 2d 1052, 179
N.Y.S.2d 659 (2d Dep't 1958) (denying employee's application for order nullifying arbitration proceeding in which he was not advised of right to counsel); Stone, supra note 14, at
12. Nevertheless, the fact that a warning was or was not given should be considered when
determining the appropriate evidentiary weight to be accorded an employee's admission,
particularly where professional security investigators elicited the proffered confession. See
Safeway Stores, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. 1195, 1201-02 (1971) (Jacobs, Arb.).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1

the satisfaction of the arbitrator that the grievant actually engaged
in misconduct. 55 In this regard, the arbitral rule is analogous to
common-law principles that place the burden of proof on the party
alleging the wrongdoing. 56
The same reasoning precludes an inference of guilt when an
employee refuses to testify on his own behalf at an arbitration
proceeding. 5 7 Arbitrators recognize that a worker can have many
good reasons for not taking the stand, totally unrelated to the
fundamental issue of guilt. 58 Of course, if the employee refuses to
controvert substantial independent evidence of his guilt, the result
will generally be a denial of his grievance.5 9
Although an employee's refusal to answer investigative inquiries concerning his suspected misconduct may not be considered as evidence of his guilt, 60 it is possible for such recalcitrance
itself to constitute an independent ground for discipline. Many
arbitrators have indicated that when an employee fails to cooperate
with his employer during an investigation of industrial misconduct-even if the reticent worker is himself under suspicion-such
conduct may itself warrant some punishment. 6'
55 See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 621 (3d ed. 1973).

I know of no principle, or decided case, upholding a company's right to
compel an employee, under pain of discharge [for suspected misconduct], to
admit or deny a rule violation or other offense. Such a principle would contradict
all our Anglo-American principles, particularly the one that a man is presumed
innocent until he is proved guilty, and that the burden of proof [regarding the
suspected misconduct] is on the one alleging an offense.
Exact Weight Scale Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 8, 8-9 (1967) (McCoy, Arb.). Cf. United States v.
Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975) (accused's silence during police interrogation too prejudicial to
be mentioned at trial).
If the grievant had previously responded to employer inquiries with answers inconsistent with those given at the arbitration hearing, those prior statements can be used before
the arbitrator to impeach the grievant's testimony. See Southern Iron & Equip. Co., 65 Lab.
Arb. 694 (1975) (Rutherford, Arb.).
57 Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 270, 273 (1955) (McCoy, Arb.). But cf.
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316-20 (1976) (permitting adverse inference to be
drawn from inmate's silence at disciplinary proceedings).
58 Jones, supra note 16, at 1292. See National Carbide Co., 49 Lab. Arb. 692, 696
(1967) (Kesselman, Arb.): "[Slome people make poor witnesses because of their demeanor,
their inability to be responsive to direct questions, the tendency to become rattled, etc." See
also Publishers' Ass'n of New York City, 43 Lab. Arb. 400, 404 (1964) (Altieri, Arb.).
" See, e.g., United Parcel Serv., Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 1050, 1052 (1965) (Turkus, Arb.);
Congoleum-Nairn, Inc., 63-2 Lab. Arb. Awards 8843 (1963) (Short, Arb.); Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 26 Lab. Arb. 742, 746-47 (1956) (McCoy, Arb.); Brown Shoe Co., 16 Lab.
Arb. 461, 465 (1951) (Klamon, Arb.). See also R. FLEMING, supra note 54, at 185; Carlson &
Phillips, supra note 14, at 539-40.
60See notes 54-56 and accompanying text supra.
61 Employers have a right to absolute honesty, as well as a reasonable amount of
56
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Since the fifth amendment's self-incrimination privilege is not
directly applicable to the private industrial setting, workers do not
enjoy the same protections vis-a-vis management investigative inquiries as they do with respect to interrogations by governmental
law enforcers. 62 Thus, as long as suspected misconduct relates
solely to the employment environment and has no possible criminal
ramifications, the employer has the right to require reasonable
cooperation from its workers during an investigation. Employees
who fail to cooperate in such a situation by intentionally refusing to
respond to relevant management inquiries subject themselves to
reasonable discipline.
A more delicate problem arises when the employee's answers
to company questions might lead to criminal liability. Whenever
possible, an employer should endeavor to honor a worker's invocation of his self-incrimination privilege if the prospect of resulting
criminal prosecution is real. Nevertheless, if employer and employee cannot reach a mutually acceptable accommodation of their
competing interests, management ought to have the right to demand, upon penalty of discipline, 63 immediate answers to relevant
investigative inquiries, provided (1) there is independent evidence
reasonably implicating the employee in question and (2) the employer can demonstrate that the worker's recalcitrance will have a
meaningfully adverse impact upon industrial production or disci-

cooperation, from their employees.
The Fifth Amendment does not guarantee that a person who invokes it ...
shall be continued in employment.

The grievant had a right to make himself 200 percent secure against criminal
involvement, but he cannot simultaneously protect his rights to future employment when his position frustrated the legitimate right and interest of the Company.

Simoniz Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 658, 663-64 (1964) (McGury, Arb.). See Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 63
Lab. Arb. 968, 974 (1974) (Dolnick, Arb.); Aldens, Inc., 58 Lab. Arb. 1213, 1215 (1972)
(McGury, Arb.); Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 27 Lab. Arb. 709, 712-13 (1956) (Maggs, Arb.).
See also Fleming, supra note 16, at 153; Jones, supra note 16, at 1287-88; Spelfogel, supra
note 6, at 186; Wirtz, supra note 31, at 20.
62
See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
63 Termination would normally not constitute a reasonable penalty, except perhaps
where the employee's refusal to cooperate demonstrably exacerbates the impact of the mis-

conduct by preventing the early correction of an increasingly dangerous situation, or
where the taciturn worker has a particularly dismal disciplinary record. See Tectum Corp.,

37 Lab. Arb. 807, 811 (1961) (Autrey, Arb.). See also Rexall Drug Co., 65 Lab. Arb. 1101,
1102, 1104 (1975) (Cohen, Arb.) (arbitrator cognizant of suspected employee's right to
remain silent in face of possible criminal liability, but decides that total silence without
express reliance on fifth amendment warrants imposition of some discipline).
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pline. Although a suspension without pay, pending the resolution
of the underlying criminal issues, might well be appropriate in
such a situation, 64 discharge should be permitted in only extreme
circumstances, as when the unanswered suspicion has substantially
and irreversibly devastated the employer-employee relationship. 65
3.

Right of Employees to Representation During Questioning

In NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc. 66 the United States Supreme
Court interpreted the NLRA as providing employees with the right
to union representation during at least some investigatory or disciplinary interviews. In addition, some collective bargaining agreements have been construed as expressly or implicitly affording
workers similar representation rights in certain interrogation situations.
a. Right to Representation Under NLRA. Although the Labor
Board ruled in 1945 that employees had the right, under the
NLRA, to union representation during certain management investigatory interviews, 67 it subsequently issued a decision implicitly
64 See Central Soya Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 342, 345 (1960) (Russell, Arb.); New York Times
Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 442, 446-47 (1957) (Seitz, Arb.) (allowing indefinite suspension of employee after his arrest for bookmaking); Pfeiffer Brewing Co., 26 Lab. Arb. 570, 571-72
(1956) (Ryder, Arb.) (denying back pay to reinstated employee after reasonable suspension). Such a suspension should not, however, be permitted to continue for an unreasonable period of time without substantiation of charges against the employee or other definite and final action that could be challenged through the arbitration process. See Plough,
Inc., 54 Lab. Arb. 541, 544-46 (1970) (Autrey, Arb.); News Syndicate Co., 43 Lab. Arb.
511, 512-14 (1964) (Berkowitz, Arb.); Cities Serv. Oil Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 1091, 1093-94
(1963) (Oppenheim, Arb.).
65 Even where the employer eventually fails to establish that the employee was involved
in misconduct, some arbitrators will still uphold punishment previously imposed for that
misconduct where the employee refused to cooperate with the employer's investigation. See
note 32 and accompanying text supra. Such an approach makes little sense, however, where
refusal to cooperate was not the reason for the original imposition of discipline. See
Gardner Denver Co., 51 Lab. Arb. 1019, 1022 (1968) (Ray, Arb.); V.J. Tito, Jr., Inc., 48
Lab. Arb. 188, 190 (1967) (Summers, Arb.); West Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 10 Lab. Arb. 117,
118 (1947) (Guthrie, Arb.). A company might avoid this dilemma by specifying both the
suspected offense and the refusal to cooperate as the basis for the punishment. Nonetheless, failure to establish the suspected misconduct would probably result in modification of
the penalty.
66420 U.S. 251 (1975).
67 Ross Gear & Tool Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1012, 1033-34, 17 L.R.R.M. 36, 39 (1945). The
Seventh Circuit denied enforcement of the Labor Board's decision, indicating that insubordination would be encouraged if employees could refuse to attend such management
meetings if their union representative was not present. NLRB v. Ross Gear & Tool Co.,
158 F.2d 607, 613 (7th Cir. 1947).
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rejecting this principle. 6 8 In 1967, however, the NLRB revitalized
the doctrine it had enunciated in 1945,69 and in Weingarten the
Supreme Court expressly recognized the right of workers to have
union representation during certain employer interrogation ses70
sions.
Weingarten7 1 involved a retail store employee who was accused
of dishonesty and summoned to an interview with a professional
security investigator.7 2 The employee expressly requested that her
union shop steward be present during the questioning, but this
supplication was denied. She filed an unfair labor practice charge,
and the NLRB determined that the employer had by its conduct
violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. 3 Although the Fifth Circuit
denied enforcement of the Labor Board's order,7 4 the Supreme
Court reversed,7 5 holding that the denial of representation constituted illegal interference with the right of employees to act in
concert-a right guaranteed under section 7 of the NLRA. 7 6 Thus,
" Dobbs Houses, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1565, 1571, 55 L.R.R.M. 1218, 1218 (1964)
(NLRB summarily affirmed trial examiner's refusal to recognize the right of employee to
have union representation at disciplinary meeting). See Note, Union Presence in Disciplinary
Meetings, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 329, 329 n.2 (1974).
69Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Div., 168 N.L.R.B. 361, 362, 66 L.R.R.M. 1296,
1297 (1967), enforcement denied on other grounds, 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969). Subsequent
Labor Board decisions modified and clarified the right of employees to union representation during investigatory interviews. See Western Elec. Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 195, 84 L.R.R.M.
1041 (1973); New York Tel. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 1153, 83 L.R.R.M. 1353 (1973); Mobil Oil
Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052, 80 L.R.R.M. 1188 (1972), enforcement denied, 482 F.2d 842 (7th
Cir. 1973); Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 79 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1972), enforcement denied, 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 276 (1975); Lafayette Radio Elecs.
Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 491, 78 L.R.R.M. 1693 (1971); United Aircraft Corp., 179 N.L.R.B.
935, 72 L.R.R.M. 1555 (1969), aff'd on other grounds, 440 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1971); Wald Mfg.
Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 839 (1969), aff'd on other grounds, 426 F.2d 1328 (6th Cir. 1970). For
discussions of the NLRB decisions pertaining to the union representation issue, see Brodie,
Union Representation and the Disciplinary Interview, 15 B.C. INDUS. & Com. L. REv. 1, 15-31
(1973); Nelson, Union Representation During Management Investigation of Alleged Rule
Infractions, 26 LAB. L.J. 37 (1975); Note, supra note 68.
70NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). See also ILGWU v. Quality Mfg.
Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
71 For the facts of the case, see 420 U.S. at 254-56.
72 The Supreme Court recognized that frequently "an investigative interview is conducted by security specialists; the employee does not confront a supervisor who is known
or familiar to him, but a stranger trained in interrogation techniques." Id. at 265 n.10.
7329 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970), set out in note 37 supra. See J. Weingarten, Inc., 202
N.L.R.B. 446, 82 L.R.R.M. 1559 (1973).
74NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973).
75 420 U.S. at 268, rev'g 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973).
76 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). The Court stated:
"An employee's right to union representation upon request is based on Sec-
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under certain circumstances, an employee has the protected right
to union representation during management investigatory interviews. 7 7 This right, however, is not absolute.
(i) When right to representation arises. An employee's right to
union representation during an inquisitorial interview by management will arise only if the employee requests representation, and
only if he reasonably believes that the investigation will result in
disciplinary action.7 8 Even if a worker specifically asks for a union
representative,7 9 therefore, it does not automatically follow that
tion 7 of the Act which guarantees the right of employees to act in concert for
'mutual aid and [sic] protection.' The denial of this right has a reasonable tendency to interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Thus, it is a serious violation of the employee's individual right
to engage in concerted activity by seeking the assistance of his statutory representative if the employer denies the employee's request and compels the employee to
appear unassisted at an interview which may put his job security in jeopardy. Such
a dilution of the employee's right to act collectively to protect his job interests is
. . . unwarranted interference with his right to insist on concerted protection,
rather than individual self-protection, against possible adverse employer action."
420 U.S. at 256-57 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052, 1052, 80 L.R.R.M. 1188,
1191 (1972)).
Requiring a lone employee to attend an investigatory interview which he reasonably believes may result in the imposition of discipline perpetuates the inequality
the Act was designed to eliminate, and bars recourse to the safeguards the Act
provided "to redress the perceived imbalance of economic power between labor
and management."
420 U.S. at 262 (quoting American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965)).
" The Labor Board recently held that this right includes an opportunity for
pre-interview consultation between the employee and his union representative. Amax, Inc.,
227 N.L.R.B. No. 154, 94 L.R.R.M. 1177 (Jan. 18, 1977).
Although the interviewee apparently does not have the absolute right to designate the
particular union representative he would like to have present, he should generally be permitted to select someone he knows and respects. If granting such a specific request immediately would cause operational difficulties, the company can either postpone the interview or require the worker to select some other representative. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
227 N.L.R.B. No. 173, 94 L.R.R.M. 1200 (Jan. 21, 1977). Similarly, if the employee suggests a steward who might be personally involved in the underlying matter to the extent
that his presence could be detrimental to the questioning process, the employer would
probably have the right to refuse to permit that representative to be present. See Service
Tech. Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 845, 845 n.1, 80 L.R.R.M. 1187, 1188 (1972).
78 NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 257 (1975). The NLRB recently held
that a union may invoke the Weingarten rule on an employee's behalf. Amax, Inc., 227
N.L.R.B. No. 154, 94 L.R.R.M. 1177 (Jan. 18, 1977). Since the rights of the worker being
questioned are the ones most significantly affected during an investigatory interview, however, there should generally be no representation where the employee so prefers, even if
the union wants a representative to be present.
Regarding the right of an employee to waive representation, see notes 87-93 and accompanying text infra.
'9 Although this Article focuses upon unionized employees, there is no reason why
nonunion employees should not enjoy an analogous "statutory" right to have fellow work-
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such representation must be permitted. Although it is clear that the
right to representation applies solely to confrontations where the
worker reasonably fears adverse personnel action, the demarcation
line is not as precise as might initially appear.
The Supreme Court and the Labor Board have both expressed
the view that the NLRA representation prerogative is clearly not
applicable to certain ordinary industrial situations.
We would not apply the rule to such run-of-the-mill shop-floor
conversations as, for example, the giving of instructions or training or needed corrections of worktechniques. In such cases there
cannot normally be any reasonable basis for an employee to fear
that any adverse impact may result from the interview, and thus
we would then see no reasonable basis for him to seek the assistance of his representative. 80
But suppose a supervisor instructs an employee to perform certain
work and the employee indicates a reluctance to comply, precipitating a warning that failure to obey may be regarded as insubordination. It would appear that if discussion" were to continue under
such circumstances, the worker, upon request, would have the
right to union representation.
A similar problem could easily develop from discussion pertaining to a managerial correction of an employee's work techniques. Even if the employer does not initially contemplate
disciplinary action, the fact that the discussion occurred may subsequently be held against the worker if the allegedly inferior performance continued. In addition, if the employer utilizes a merit
system, the employee may reasonably fear that such a conversation
would have an "adverse impact" upon a future evaluation. Perhaps
such hypothetical situations"' involve the kind of "ordinary" matters exempt from the Weingarten representation requirement, but
until definitive NLRB guidelines are developed, considerable un82
certainty will remain.
ers accompany them during disciplinary interviews that meet the Weingarten requirements.
Such workers would certainly be engaging in "concerted activities for .. . mutual aid or
protection" (29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970)) within the meaning of the NLRA. See NLRB v. Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922, 931 (2d Cir. 1976). Cf. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co.,
370 U.S. 9 (1962) (upholding right of nonunion workers to take concerted action in protest
of working conditions).
80 NLRB v.J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1975) (quoting Quality Mfg. Co.,
195 N.L.R.B. 197, 199, 79 L.R.R.M. 1269, 1271 (1972)).
8 For a discussion of similar problem areas, see Brodie, supra note 69, at 4-5.
82 If a worker were to misjudge the situation and refuse to participate in a managerial
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It should finally be noted that even where a reasonable basis
exists to believe that adverse personnel action might result from a
particular employer-employee confrontation, management could
still avoid application of the Weingarten representation doctrine by
simply forgoing the confrontation and basing its disciplinary determination on independently obtained information. As long as the
employer's action is not based upon the employee's assertion of a
83
statutory right, the company can act without violating the NLRA.
(ii) Function of union representative. Although the Weingarten

Court affirmed the statutory right of an employee to union representation during certain investigatory interviews, it indicated that
the role of the union agent would be quite limited.
The employer has no duty to bargain with the union representative at an investigatory interview. "The representative is present
to assist the employee, and may attempt to clarify the facts or
suggest other employees who may have knowledge of them. The
employer, however, is free to insist that he is only interested, at that time,
in hearing the employee's own account of the matter under investi84
gation.",

interview when there was no reason to anticipate any discipline, he would presumably be
subject to punishment for insubordination. On the other hand, if an employee requested
union representation during a management meeting and the employer refused it, erroneously believing that no adverse consequences were likely to result, the employer could
easily be exposed to § 8(a)(1) liability if disclosures made during that interview indicated
the need for discipline. In questionable situations, employers are best advised to resolve
doubts in favor of permitting representation. Cf. Certified Grocers of Cal., 227 N.L.R.B.
No. 52, 94 L.R.R.M. 1279 (Jan. 19, 1977) (employer violated LMRA in denying employee's
request for union representative at meeting where employee reasonably anticipated disciplinary action).
83 NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 258-59 (1975). See Western Elec. Co.,
205 N.L.R.B. 195, 84 L.R.R.M. 1041 (1973).
If an employer exercises its option to terminate an investigatory interview rather than
permit union representation for the worker being questioned, the labor representative
might still endeavor to have management listen to the employee's side of the matter. The
union might propose a meeting involving the affected worker, management, and the union
itself, to discuss the situation before any disciplinary action is taken. If the company declines to participate, it might well be in violation of § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA (29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1970)) for refusing to bargain in good faith regarding employee working conditions. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). But cf. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 L.R.R.M.
1530 (1977) (advice memorandum of NLRB General Counsel) (no violation of right to
representation in discharge of worker where employer ceased contact with worker after
he requested representation).
84 420 U.S. at 260 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 22) (emphasis added). See Nelson,
Epilog: The Right to Union Representation During Management Investigation of Alleged Rule
Infraction, 26 LAB. L.J. 594, 596 (1975).
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Thus, under the Weingarten rationale, the requested union representative can be an observer 8 5 and can advise the interviewee of
any relevant privileges he enjoys under the applicable collective
bargaining agreement. In the absence of a contractual provision
codifying an employee self-incrimination privilege, however, the
labor representative cannot instruct the worker that he has the
right to remain silent.8 6
(iii) Right of employee to waive representation privilege. Since the
right to union representation during an investigatory interview
arises only in situations where the employee requests representation, the employee "may forgo his guaranteed right and, if he
prefers, participate in an interview unaccompanied by his union
87
representative."
85 The observation function enables the labor organization to obtain important information at an early stage. This information might subsequently aid the union in fulfilling its

representative function.
56 It is important to recognize that § 7 of the NLRA neither expressly nor impliedly
provides an employee with a self-incrimination privilege, nor does Weingarten suggest such
a right. The Labor Act merely requires that when an employer desires to question a
worker under circumstances likely to result in discipline, it must either permit the presence
of a union representative, if requested by the interviewee, or forgo the interrogation and
rely upon independently obtained information. If a union representative is provided,
therefore, the employer presumably has the right to insist that the employee answer relevant inquiries and, unless fifth amendment principles are expressly made applicable by
contract, the company may properly discipline the worker for refusing to cooperate.
Since the fifth amendment is generally inapplicable, reliance upon a union agent's
admonition to remain silent would probably not afford an employee any direct protection;
such advice would necessarily exceed the scope of authority granted to the representative
under Weingarten. If the union representative gives such advice in good faith, the adversely
affected employee has no legal recourse. Cf. Lewis v. Greyhound Lines-East, 555 F.2d 1053
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (since no bad faith found, union did not breach duty of fair representation
in telling employee that he was not entitled to representative at disciplinary meeting). If,
however, the labor agent acts in bad faith or maliciously while performing his representative function, his union should clearly be subject to unfair labor practice liability or a civil
suit by the aggrieved worker for breach of the statutory duty of fair representation. Cf
Brodie, supra note 69, at 47 (union's duty of fair representation should be expanded to
cover interview situation). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41 (1957); Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312, 57 L.R.R.M. 1535
(1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Miranda Fuel
Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962), enforcement denied on other grounds, 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). See generally Craver, Minority Action versus Union Exclusivity: The

Need to Harmonize NLRA and Title VII Policies, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 22-29 (1974).
87 NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 257 (1975). See Mobil Oil Corp., 196
N.L.R.B. 1052, 1052 n.2, 80 L.R.R.M. 1188, 1191 n.2 (1972). See also Southwest Ornamental Iron Co., 201 N.L.R.B. 1023, 82 L.R.R.M. 1432 (1973) (employee may forfeit statutory
right by failing to request representation until interview nearly over). But see note 78 supra.
Where a company initially denies an employee's request for representation, a subse-
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In general, an employer is not obligated to advise a prospective interviewee, prior to any questioning, of his statutory right to
representation. Only when employers seek information that may
be protected under the NLRA8 8 are they required to provide employees with proper express notice of the right to representation.8 9
In all other cases, an employer has an inherent right to conduct
investigatory interviews pertaining to employment misconduct, and
is not statutorily obligated to provide union representation for employees being questioned. Management has the discretion to proceed with its inquiries subject to a representation requirement only
in those cases where the interviewee specifically requests representation. 90 If a worker fails to exercise his NLRA privilege due to
ignorance, his complaint should be directed not at his employer,
but at his union. 91
Even though an employee has the general authority to waive
his Weingarten representation privilege, such an individual waiver is
not wholly operative where the investigatory interview is meaningfully converted into a "grievance"-adjustment discussion. It is conceivable, for example, that during the questioning of an interviewee, the company might suggest an appropriate penalty for the
suspected misconduct, and the two parties might discuss the proquent decision by the employee to participate in the meeting without his representative
would probably be deemed a valid relinquishment of his Weingarten privilege. Cf. Michigan
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (upholding admissibility of statements made to police by
suspect who first exercised right to remain silent but later made inculpatory statements
after again being informed of rights). Query: Under such circumstances, could the
employee's action ever be regarded as truly "voluntary?"
88
See notes 36-41 and accompanying text supra.
89 See Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1063, 65 L.R.R.M. 1385, 1387 (1967);
Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 770, 775, 55 L.R.R.M. 1403, 1406 (1964), enforcement
denied on other grounds, 344 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1965). See also notes 43-44 and accompanying
text supra.
90 A labor organization would be wise to advise all employees suspected of misconduct
to seek representation for an investigatory interview, since the union representative can
assist with a full development of the relevant facts and thus reduce the likelihood of improper discipline. The representative's participation may also obviate the need for a subsequent formal grievance proceeding. Moreover, the presence of a representative does not
unduly restrict the company's freedom of action, since it still has the right to obtain the
information it desires.
91 See Brodie, supra note 69, at 44. Despite the recent NLRB decision in Amax, Inc.,
227 N.L.R.B. No. 154, 94 L.R.R.M. 1177 (Jan. 18, 1977), allowing unions to invoke representation rights on behalf of employees, it is doubtful that a labor organization can make
a blanket request for representation on behalf of all workers any time discipline might result from a particular interview. However, a union can seek a contractual right to this effect through the collective bargaining process. See discussion accompanying notes 99-117
infra.
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priety of the proposed discipline. Under such circumstances, the
exclusivity doctrine expressed in section 9(a) of the NLRA might
apply. 92 This section provides that the majority-designated labor
organization is the exclusive negotiating agent for all workers in
the defined bargaining unit. Thus, in addition to the section 7
representation right recognized in Weingarten and exercised by the
individual interviewee, there is an independent statutorily created
representation prerogative within the exclusive dominion of the
majority labor organization. If, even with the acquiescence of the
interested employee, the employer attempts to adjust a "grievance"
created during an investigatory interview without the presence of a
union representative, the company might well find itself in viola93
tion of the NLRA.
(iv) Right of union to waive employee representation privilege. Although a majority labor organization undoubtedly has the right to
relinquish its section 9(a) privilege to be present during grievanceadjustment discussions between employee and employer, 94 it is not
clear whether it has the authority to surrender contractually the
section 7 right of employees to have union representation during
investigatory interviews. However, it would probably constitute a
refusal to bargain for an employer to insist upon such a waiver as a
95
precondition to negotiating an agreement.
Recognizing the important individual interests often implicated as a result of investigatory interviews, one could certainly
argue that a labor organization should not be permitted to negate
the privilege of union representation through the bargaining
92

Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit . . . Provided, That any
individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to
present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without
the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not
inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then
in effect: Providedfurther, That the bargainingrepresentative has been given opportunity
to be present at such adjustment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
93 See Bethlehem Steel Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 341, 347-48, 25 L.R.R.M. 1564, 1568-69 (1950).
An unfair labor practice could arise even if the company merely declines to accept the
position of the complaining employee, since there is "nothing in the Act or its legislative
history warranting an interpretation of the term 'adjustment' as used in the provisos to
Section 9(a) which would exclude from the meaning of that term the rejection of a grievance." Id. at 348, 25 L.R.R.M. at 1569.
94 See Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 73 (5th Cir. 1945). See also Note, supra
note 68, at 349.
95
See Bethlehem Steel Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 341, 342, 25 L.R.R.M. 1564, 1565 (1950).
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process. 96 The representation right, however, does not exist wholly
apart from the majority union. It is instead a privilege that enhances the relationship between that union and the workers it represents. Therefore, if the labor organization decides in good faith
that the employees' interests would be best served by permitting
investigatory interviews without the presence of union representatives, then the union should be able to relinquish the Weingarten
rights of the workers in the bargaining unit.97 Such a waiver would
not deprive organized workers of all meaningful protection, since
they would almost certainly be afforded the substantial security of
98
a grievance-arbitration system.
b. ContractualRight to Representation. The contractual right of
employees to union representation during management investigatory interviews is an increasingly frequent subject of arbitration.9 9
Some of the cases involve specific provisions which must merely be
construed by the arbitrator. More difficult problems arise when
labor organizations contend that a representation right emanates
implicitly from nonspecific clauses in collective bargaining agreements. 10 0 However, before unions endeavor to obtain an express or
implied contractual right to union representation during management investigative sessions, they should consider the advantages
and disadvantages associated with such a privilege.
96

See Note, supra note 68, at 349. Cf. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974)
(union cannot contractually waive employees' section 7 right to distribute union literature
on company property).
97 See Western Elec. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 623, 625-26, 80 L.R.R.M. 1705, 1706-07 (1972)
(agreement excluding union representatives at investigatory interviews held not violative of
NLRA). Cf. Shell Oil Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 161, 164, 27 L.R.R.M. 1330, 1331 (1951) (union
may waive its right to select persons to negotiate with employer on grievances). To be
effective, such a waiver must be clear and unequivocal. See New York Tel. Co., 219
N.L.R.B. 679, 89 L.R.R.M. 1723 (1975); New York Tel. Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 685, 89
L.R.R.M. 1725 (1975).
98 At least 94% of the negotiated contracts in the United States provide for binding
arbitration as the dispute resolution procedure. See [1970] LAB. REL. Y.B. (BNA) 38. See
also Summers, supra note 24, at 499-508.
99 See generally Brodie, supra note 69, at 34-41.
100To the extent that collective bargaining agreements either expressly or impliedly
provide employees with representation rights during investigatory interviews, it should follow afortiori that, as sole creations of the labor-management relationship, such rights can
be waived by the union, as long as it acts in good faith. Similarly, where an optional right
to representation is provided for individual workers, they too are empowered to forgo
their privilege. See Erwin Mills, Inc., 43 Lab. Arb. 31, 32 (1963) (Strong, Arb.). To the
extent that the presence of a union agent is contractually required at such meetings, however, an individual employee should not be permitted to relinquish the right, since to do so
might cut against the interests of other bargaining unit members.
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Increased union participation at the initial stages of a misconduct investigation will frequently prevent the imposition of unjust
punishment before management has made a final decision on the
matter.1 0 ' Similarly, it may ensure that contractual and statutory
rights are not violated, and lead to a reduction in the number of
02
issues litigated before either an arbitrator or the Labor Board.'
In addition, the presence of a union agent probably reduces the
coercive atmosphere inherent in inquisitorial sessions, although
this result may not always inure to the benefit of suspected workers. If an interrogation conducted in the absence of a union representative elicits injurious admissions from the interviewee, the
presiding neutral in a subsequent arbitration proceeding is likely to
view the admissions with skepticism and accord them only minimal
probative value.' 0 3 However, if a union steward is present when
inculpatory disclosures are obtained, the employee in question
will find it extremely difficult to challenge the veracity or voluntariness of his utterances.' 0 4 Furthermore, if the union steward at the
meeting pleads for moderation, and the employer decides nevertheless to impose severe discipline, the labor organization will have
problems during the formal stages of the grievance process con05
vincing management that it acted precipitously and improperly.
Despite the possible disadvantages of the right to representation, some unions have negotiated specific contractual provisions
requiring the presence of a union steward during all employeemanagement confrontations that could culminate in disciplinary
action.' 0 6 Other less comprehensive provisions guarantee the sus101 See Note, supra note 68, at 342.
102 See Brodie, supra note 69, at 42; Note, supra note 68, at 344. Disputes can frequently
be resolved on an informal basis. Any settlement discussions conducted can not later be
used against the parties in an arbitration proceeding should no amicable accord be achieved.
See, e.g., Price-Pfister Brass Mfg. Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 398, 403-04 (1955) (Prasow, Arb.); StyIon S. Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. 430, 436 (1955) (Marshall, Arb.); E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 14 Lab. Arb. 494, 497 (1950) (Cornsweet, Arb.).
03 See, e.g., Thrifty Drug Stores Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 1253, 1262 (1968) (Jones, Arb.).
104 The union representative might even find himself in the uncomfortable position of
being called as a witness for the company against the very employee he was acting to
protect.
105 See Edwards, supra note 14, at 165.
0
1 6See Eaton Corp., 66 Lab. Arb. 581, 582 (1976) (Emerson, Arb.); Allied Paper Co.,
53 Lab. Arb. 226, 227 (1969) (Holly, Arb.). Where the right to union representation is
contractually established, an employee must either utilize one of the designated stewards or
forgo his privilege. He would probably not be permitted to select as his representative an
individual not approved by the contracting union. See Yale Transp., Inc., 41 Lab. Arb. 736,
736-37 (1963) (Kerrison, Arb.); Roadway Express, Inc., 38 Lab. Arb. 1076, 1078-80 (1962)
(Short, Arb.).
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pected employee a meeting with company officials in the presence
of his union representative before a termination or suspension may
10 7
be imposed.
Even when no specific contractual provision mandates representation during investigatory interviews, there is an enlightened
trend in favor of permitting suspected employees to have shop
stewards present during meetings with management officials.
Many arbitrators, faced with contractual language generally providing for union representation during grievance discussions, have
liberally interpreted such language to cover investigative meetings
in which the company expressly or impliedly makes accusations of
misconduct. These arbitrators have concluded that once such circumstances are present, a sufficient "grievance" has arisen, due to
the immediate threat to the worker's employment security, to warrant application of the union representation requirement. 10 8 Other
arbitrators, however, have continued to follow a more traditional
course, denying an employee union representation until discipline
has been imposed and a formal grievance has been formulated. 0 9
The more liberal interpretive approach is preferable, since it facilitates the early resolution of often volatile disciplinary issues and
advances the national labor policy enunciated in Weingarten.
Some arbitrators who have been unwilling or unable to construe the representation rights of grievance provisions as extending
to investigatory meetings have accomplished the same result
through implication. Decisions have found a right to representation emanating from a general recognition clause,ii ° past practices

107

See Dayton Malleable, Inc., 66 Lab. Arb. 582, 583 (1976) (High, Arb.); Southern

Cal. Edison Co., 61 Lab. Arb. 453, 459-61 (1973) (Block, Arb.). See also U.S. Army TankAutomotive Command, 65 Lab. Arb. 642, 642-43 (1975) (Daniel, Arb.); Clow Corp., 64
Lab. Arb. 668, 672 (1975) (Gibson, Arb.). Some agreements even require the employer to
advise an employee of his right to union representation, where contractually applicable. See
Naval Air Rework Facility, 54 Lab. Arb. 307, 310 (1969) (Carson, Arb.). In the absence of
such a specific provision, however, it is the obligation of the union to inform workers of
their contractual right to representation. See notes 88-91 and accompanying text supra.
108 See Waste King Universal Prods. Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 283, 285-87 (1966) (Petree,
Arb.); Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 647, 650-52 (undated) (Dworkin, Arb.); Valley
Iron Works, 33 Lab. Arb. 769, 770-71 (1960) (Anderson, Arb.); Independent Lock Co., 30
Lab. Arb. 744, 745-47 (1958) (Murphy, Arb.); Braniff Airways, Inc., 27 Lab. Arb. 892,
896-97 (1957) (Williams, Arb.).
109 See Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 63 Lab. Arb. 968, 976-79 (1974) (Dolnick, Arb.); South
Central Bell Tel. Co., 59 Lab. Arb. 134, 138-39 (1972) (Seward, Arb.); United Air Lines,
Inc., 28 Lab. Arb. 179, 180 (1956) (Wenke, Arb.). See also Masonite Corp., 54 Lab. Arb.
633, 638-39 (1970) (Stouffer, Arb.).
0
" See Schlitz Brewing Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 57, 60 (1959) (Meyers, Arb.). But see E. I. du
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of the parties, 1 1 ' and even through the implied incorporation of
the constitutional right to counsel."' The Weingarten Court approvingly cited these creative interpretive techniques: "Even where
such a right [to representation] is not explicitly provided in the
agreement a 'well-established current of arbitral authority' sustains
the right of union representation at investigatory interviews which
the employee reasonably believes may result in disciplinary action
against him."" 3 With this language in mind, arbitrators will find
with increasing frequency that the right to representation during
investigatory confrontations with management is either expressly
or impliedly incorporated in collective bargaining agreements.
Finally, brief mention should be made of the remedial ramifications of a violation of an employee's contractual right to representation. When a proper request for the presence of a union
steward during an investigatory interview is denied, the refusal of
the aggrieved worker to participate in the management meeting
ought not to constitute insubordination. The vital importance of
the representation privilege warrants an exception to the usual rule
that an employee must obey first and grieve later," 4 since irreparable injury to the individual's employment interests might otherwise result. 1 5 Arbitrators should accord no evidentiary weight to
statements elicited in a prior proceeding from an employee who
6
had been improperly denied his right to union representation."
Pont de Nemours & Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 646, 650 (1957) (Gregory, Arb.).
A contractual right to representation analogous to that recognized in Weingarten may
also be derived from a clause requiring the bargaining agreement to conform to applicable
federal law. See Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 67 Lab. Arb. 349, 350-51 (1976) (Clarke, Arb.).
However, such a right would be no more extensive than the representation privilege under
the NLRA itself. See Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 67 Lab. Arb. 352, 353-54 (1976) (Markowitz, Arb.).
"'See Universal Oil Prods. Co., 60 Lab. Arb. 832, 834-35 (1973) (Shieber, Arb.). But
see Texas Co., 32 Lab. Arb. 413, 416-17 (1958) (Owen, Arb.).
112See Anchor Hocking Corp., 66 Lab. Arb. 480, 481 (1976) (Emerson, Arb.). But see
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 63 Lab. Arb. 968, 973-74 (1974) (Dolnick, Arb.); United States Steel
Corp., 49 Lab. Arb. 101, 105 (1967) (Garrett, Arb.).
113NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 267 (1974) (quoting Chevron Chem.
Co., 60 Lab. Arb. 1066, 1071 (1973) (Merrill, Arb.)).
114 Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 62 Lab. Arb. 348, 350-51 (1974) (Williams, Arb.).
115See Southern Cal. Edison Co., 61 Lab. Arb. 453, 463 (1973) (Block, Arb.); Food
Employers Council, Inc., 40 Lab. Arb. 1100, 1102-03 (1963) (McNaughton, Arb.); Braniff
Airways, Inc., 27 Lab. Arb. 892, 900 (1957) (Williams, Arb.).
116See Novo Indus. Corp., 41 Lab. Arb. 921, 924 (1963) (Gill, Arb.). However, it is
appropriate to use prior statements to impeach the declarant's credibility, where he gives
testimony at the arbitration hearing inconsistent with the prior statements. See note 56
supra.
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Furthermore, although an employee necessarily acts at his own
peril if he refuses to obey a company directive when no right to
representation exists,' 17 arbitrators should consider the good faith
of the worker in determining the appropriate penalty.
III
LIE DETECTION DEVICES

In recent years, as employee peculations have become an increasingly pervasive and costly problem for private industry, many
employers have incorporated lie detection devices into their security arsenals." 8 The scientific nature of the polygraph machine' 1 9 and its concomitant aura of infallibility have induced many
management officials to accept it as a panacea for worker dishonesty. 12 0 The security programs of many companies involve not
only the examination of those actually suspected of particular defalcations, but also the general testing of job applicants and the
12 1
regular reexamination of current employees.
In contrast to the growing infatuation of business leaders with
such devices, organized labor has unequivocally condemned the
utilization of polygraph equipment in the employment setting.
We object to the use of these devices not only because their
claims to reliability are dubious, but because they infringe on the
fundamental rights of American citizens to personal privacy.
Neither the government nor private employers should be permitted to engage in this sort of police-state surveillance of the
lives of individual citizens.'

22

117See American Can Co., 57 Lab. Arb. 1063, 1065 (1971) (Kerrison, Arb.).
118 See E. LONG, THE INTRUDERS 209-10 (1966); Markson, A Reexamination of the Role of

Lie Detectors in Labor Relations, 22 LAB. L.J. 394, 394 n.1 (1971); Comment, The Polygraph in
PrivateIndustry: Regulation or Elimination?, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 655, 656-57 (1966).
119 For exhaustive descriptions of polygraphs and their uses, see C. LEE, THE INSTRU-

MENTAL DETECTION OF DECEPTION (1953); J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION
(1966). See also J. LARSON, LYING AND ITS DETECTION (1969); Inbau & Reid, The Lie Detector

Technique: A Reliable and Valuable Investigative Aid, 50 A.B.A.J. 470 (1964).
120 See 13 DE PAUL L. REv. 287, 287 (1964).
121See A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 147-5 1; Fleming, supra note 16, at 164; Note, Lie Detectors in PrivateEmployment, supra note 3, at 936-38.
122 Statement on Lie Detectors, AFL-CIO Executive Council, Bal Harbour, Florida,
Feb. 25, 1965, quoted in A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 220. See Note, Lie Detectors in Private
Employment, supra note 3, at 939. Ironically, one union subjected all of its employees to
polygraph tests on one occasion when money inexplicably disappeared from the labor

organization's headquarters safe. See Inbau & Reid, supra note 119, at 472.
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In opposing use of lie detectors,' 1 23 labor has sought both contractual restrictions and statutory prohibitions. By 1976, fifteen states
had enacted legislation either prohibiting or substantially limiting
the use of lie detectors in the employment environment. 12 4 In addition, eighteen other states have statutes that require the licensing
of polygraph operators. 2 5 Despite these various statutory circumscriptions, however, scientists continue to develop purportedly
accurate lie detection devices.
Although traditional lie detection methods such as polygraphs 2 6 and truth serums 27 have undergone significant tech12aSee E. LONG, supra note 118, at 210. But cf. 51 A.B.A.J. 456, 457 (1965) (ABA
editorial
opposing legal proscriptions on the voluntary utilization of polygraph testing).
12 4 See Comment, Privacy: The Polygraph in Employment, 30 ARK. L. REv. 35, 37-38
(1976); Note, Lie Detectors in the Employment Context, 35 LA. L. REV. 694, 700-02 (1975). See
also Hermann, supra note 3, at 97-102; Comment, The Polygraph and Labor Arbitration, 19
SYRACUSE L. REV. 684, 694-96 (1968).
Six states merely prohibit employers from "requiring" lie detector tests as a condition
of employment. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 378-21 to 22 (1968); IDAHO CODE §§ 44-903 to 904
(1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 41-119 (Cum. Supp. 1975); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 659.225,

.990(7) (1975); 18

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 7321 (Purdon 1973);

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§§ 49.44.120-.130 (Supp. 1976). Two other states forbid "demanding" or "requiring" the
tests. CAL- LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95 (Cum. Supp.
1976). Statutes that forbid only the "requiring" or "demanding" of polygraph tests have
been construed as permitting employers to "request" such examinations, as long as workers
who take the tests do so voluntarily. See, e.g., 43 Op. CAL. ATT'y GEN. 25 (1964). Two states
forbid employers to "subject" workers or job applicants to the use of lie detectors. MASS.
ANN. LAWS. ch. 149, § 19B (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 28-6.1-1 to .1-2
(1968). Five states preclude "requiring" or "requesting" the taking of polygraph tests as a
condition of employment. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.037 (1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51g
(1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.75 (West Supp.
1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-90.1 (West 1971). See New Jersey v. Community Distribs.,
Inc., 64 N.J. 479, 317 A.2d 697 (1974) (upholding anti-polygraph statute against constitutional challenge by an employer as proper exercise of state's authority to protect workers'
right of privacy).
125 ALA. CODE tit. 46, §§ 297(22oo)-297(22nnn) (Cum. Supp. 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 71-2201 to 2225 (Cum. Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 493.40-.56 (West Supp. 1977);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-5001 to 5016 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 202-1 to 31 (SmithHurd 1973 & Cum. Supp. 1977); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 329.010-.990 (Baldwin 1973);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 338.1701-.1729 (Supp. 1975) (Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 18.186(1)-.186(29)
(Callaghan Cum. Supp. 1977)); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 73-29-1 to 47 (1973); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 648.005-.210 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-31A-1 to 11 (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 66-49.1 to .8 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 43-31-01 to 17 (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 59, §§ 1451-1476 (West Supp. 1975); S.C. CODE §§ 56-1543.51 to .75 (Cum.
Supp. 1975); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(29cc) (Vernon 1976); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 34-37-1 to 14 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 2901-2910 (Cum. Supp. 1977); VA.
CODE §§ 54-916 to 922 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
i26 See A. LEMOND & R. FRY, supra note 3, at 132-33; A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at
133-34; Horvath & Reid, The Polygraph Silent Answer Test, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 285
(1972).
127See Despres, Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements, 14 U. CH. L. REv. 601, 601-05
(1947).
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nological and scientific development, the newer truth verification
techniques have displayed the greatest inventiveness. During the
late 1950's and early 1960's, the federal government devised a lie
detection seat that can be used without the knowledge of the individual being examined. The device consists of "a seemingly 'normal' chair which has equipment built into it to register body heat,
changes in limb volume, and nervous movements. Hidden cameras
are also used in such covert polygraphing to measure changes in
1 28
eye-pupil size as an indicator of stress during the interview."'
One firm has developed a Psychological Stress Evaluator, which
can purportedly determine veracity through the evaluation of voice
1 29
samples.
The future may witness sensing devices implanted in the
human body capable of transmitting data on psychological and
physiological changes. 3 °0 Such information could easily be applied
to evaluate the veracity of statements made during an employment
investigatory interview. Scientists may ultimately develop a
machine capable of reading thoughts through the interpretation of
cerebral impulses.'13 Such technological advances could have a
profound effect upon employees, and could give rise to exceedingly complex policy conflicts.
A.

NLRA Considerations

The use of a lie detector by an employer to discover union
sympathies or protected activities of employees clearly constitutes
an unfair labor practice.' 3 2 This does not, however, preclude all
utilization of such devices in the employment setting. An employer
may, without precipitating a section 8(a)(1) violation, promulgate
rules requiring employees to submit to polygraph examinations
regarding employment misconduct. 33 It may even ask a known
128

A.

WESTIN,

supra note 4, at 133-34 (footnote omitted).

129See Note, The Psychological Stress Evaluator: A Recent Development in Lie Detector Tech-

nology, 7 U. CAL. D.L. REV. 332 (1974). The developers report an accuracy rate of from
91% to
100%, depending upon the type of interrogation involved. Id. at 346.
"3 ' See A. MILLER, supra note 20, at 45-46.
131See A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 155-57.
132
See St. Anthony's Center, 227 N.L.R.B. No. 258, 95 L.R.R.M. 1099 (Jan. 31, 1977);
Solo Serve Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 395, 398, 90 L.R.R.M. 1079, 1079 (1975); Borden Co., 157
N.L.R.B. 1100, 1115, 61 L.R.R.M. 1467, 1467 (1966), enforced in relevant part, 392 F.2d 412
(5th Cir. 1968); Glazer's Wholesale Drug Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 467, 469-70, 59 L.R.R.M. 1157,
1158-59 (1965), enforced, 368 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1966); Aladdin Indus., Inc., 147 N.L.R.B.
1392, 1405, 56 L.R.R.M. 1388, 1390-91 (1964).
133See National Food Serv., Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 295, 296, 80 L.R.R.M. 1017, 1019
(1972). 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970) is set forth in note 37 supra. But see the discussion in
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Although an employer can use polygraph examinations to investigate employee misconduct without violating the NLRA, it
nonetheless is obligated to negotiate with the labor organization
before implementing such a program. The NLRB recently held
that required lie detector testing is sufficiently related to "terms
and conditions of employment" to constitute a mandatory subject
for collective bargaining. 139 Thus, a company's unilateral institution of such a security measure without any prior union negotiations is a violation of section 8(a)(5), 140 unless there is a management prerogative clause in the collective bargaining agreement
that could reasonably be construed to give the employer the authority to act unilaterally with respect to such a subject. 14 1 However, if the union has a chance to negotiate over the matter and
either fails to indicate a desire to discuss the suggested plan or
reaches a bona fide impasse in the course of good faith bargaining,
the company is legally entitled to implement its proposed pro42

gram.1

Along with the right to bargain regarding any management lie
detection program, a labor organization may also have the authorprovide sufficient "cause" to preclude a Labor Board reinstatement order under § 10(c) of
the Act (29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970)). See Big "G" Corp., 223 N.L.R.B. 1349, 1349, 92
L.R.R.M. 1127, 1128 (1976).
139
See Medicenter, Mid-South Hosp., 221 N.L.R.B. 670, 90 L.R.R.M. 1576 (1975). Section 8(d) of the NLRA (29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970)) mandates collective bargaining regarding "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." Under § 8(a)(5) (29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970)) an employer must bargain in good faith on mandatory topics
for negotiation. A labor organization is similarly obligated under § 8(b)(3) (29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(3)
(1970)).
40
1 Cf. NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859, 865-66 (5th Cir.
1966) (union held entitled to bargain over application forms, answers to which could
prompt unilateral changes in conditions of employment). See generally NLRB v. Katz, 369
U.S. 736 (1962).
141Cf. LeRoy Mach. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431, 1432, 56 L.R.R.M. 1369, 1370 (1964)
(management prerogative clause entitled employer to impose physical examination requirement on employees with records of high absenteeism without first bargaining with
union).
142See Medicenter, Mid-South Hosp., 221 N.L.R.B. 670, 90 L.R.R.M. 1576 (1975). Cf.
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 741-42 (1962) (duty to bargain violated since no genuine
impasse existed). See generally Bowman, An Employer's Unilateral Action-An Unfair Labor
Practice?, 9 VAND. L. REv. 487 (1956); Lang, Unilateral Changes by Management as a Violation
of the Duy To Bargain Collectively, 9 Sw. L.J. 276 (1955).
It has been suggested that a party might be able to utilize lie detection technology
during negotiations. For example, a party could surreptitiously record a bargaining session
and thereafter use a Psychological Stress Evaluator to evaluate the true position of its opponent. See Note, supra note 129, at 337. Such tactics would undermine the entire collective
bargaining process, however, and would almost certainly be considered a breach of the
stealthy party's bargaining obligation under the Labor Act.
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union adherent to submit to a lie detector test, as long as the
motivation for the request is wholly unrelated to matters protected
by the NLRA. l3 4 Furthermore, if the employee declines to take the
test, the Labor Act does not prevent management from discharging the worker because of his refusal to cooperate.13 5 On the other
hand, if an employer is motivated by a desire to retaliate against an
employee for engaging in some protected activity, the employer's
action would constitute an unfair labor practice, and the Labor
Board could rightfully ignore any other reasons offered to support
management's conduct.13 6 If an employee agrees to a polygraph
examination concerning unprotected activities, however, the employer may discharge him for failing the test, 3 7 as long as the
purported failure was not merely a pretense for the employer's
38
anti-union sentiment.1
notes 139-42 and accompanying text infra, regarding the obligation of an employer to
negotiate over the implementation of such a policy.
134 See Fotomat Corp., 207 N.L.R.B. 461, 470, 84 L.R.R.M. 1487, 1490-91 (1973),
enforced,
497 F.2d 901 (6th Cir. 1974).
135 See Shoppers Drug Mart, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. No. 140, 94 L.R.R.M. 1223 (Nov. 10,
1976); American Oil Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 3, 4, 76 L.R.R.M. 1506, 1507-08 (1971). The
NLRB General Counsel has refused to issue unfair labor practice complaints where workers were terminated for refusing to take polygraph tests, absent evidence of anti-union
motivation on the part of management. See Case No. SR-211, 45 L.R.R.M. 1074 (1959);
Case No. F-816, 43 L.R.R.M. 1377 (1958). If, however, the employee is disciplined for
requesting union representation prior to the testing based on a reasonable belief that the
polygraph interview could jeopardize his employment situation, the employer will be guilty
of an unfair labor practice. See Dale Indus., Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1050, 1062-65, 55 L.R.R.M.
1115, 1116-17 (1964), rev'd on other grounds, 355 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1966). See generally notes
67-83 and accompanying text supra. See notes 178-98 and accompanying text infra, regarding the contractual right of employers to discipline employees who decline to submit to lie
detector examinations.
3
' 6See National Food Serv., Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 295, 296, 80 L.R.R.M. 1017, 1019
(1972); Southwire Co., 159 N.L.R.B. 394, 397-99, 62 L.R.R.M. 1280, 1282 (1966), enforced
in relevant part, 383 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1967).
13 1See Falstaff Beer Distribs., 152 N.L.R.B. 1570, 1575-76, 59 L.R.R.M. 1442, 1442-43
(1965). Because most polygraph tests administered by employers are directed at misconduct totally unrelated to protected worker activity, the discharge of employees for failing
such tests rarely constitutes an unfair labor practice. See generally notes 38-41 and accompanying text supra. In some cases, however, the worker's alleged misconduct may be inextricably intertwined with protected activity. In such cases, termination could well constitute
a § 8(a)(1) violation, despite the good faith of the employer, since the discharge would have
a chilling effect on the right of employees to engage in protected conduct. See NLRB v.
Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 22-24 (1964); Standard Oil Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 783,
790-91, 26 L.R.R.M. 1587, 1589 (1950); Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 54 N.L.R.B. 912,
932-34, 13 L.R.R.M. 228, 229 (1944).
13 See, e.g., Southwire Co., 159 N.L.R.B. 394, 395-97, 62 L.R.R.M. 1280, 1282 (1966),
enforced in relevant part, 383 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1967); Lone Star Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 688,
693-98, 57 L.R.R.M. 1365, 1367-69 (1964). If an employee who fails a polygraph examination is discharged in violation of the NLRA, his failure of the exam does not automatically
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ity to consent to the administration of polygraph tests. Under the
exclusivity doctrine of section 9(a) of the NLRA, 143 the rights of
individual employees are generally subservient to the interests of
the majority. 144 Assuming that the union acts in complete good
faith, it can probably negotiate an agreement giving the employer
the authority to terminate anyone who refuses to take a polygraph
examination. Such an agreement might be in the best interests of a
majority of the employees if employee crime seriously threatens the
company.' 45 It must also be recognized, however, that "where
legitimate individual interests are submerged by the desires of the
majority, there is a need for protection of individual rights through
checks on majority rule."' 4 6 The Labor Board could endeavor to
resolve this inherent conflict through modification and expansion
of the fair representation doctrine. 147 However, arbitration provides a preferable means for adjudicating these controversies, since
the competing interests involved are best resolved on a case-by-case
basis.' 48 Another possibility is to expand state and federal statutory
protection of individual employees to supplement the limited au14 9
thority of the NLRB.
B.

Right of Employer To Rely Upon Results of Properly
Administered Examination

A majority of American courts have refused to admit the results of polygraph tests on the ground that the techniques involved
are not generally accepted by the appropriate scientific authorities.' 50 Although traditional rules of evidence do not apply in ar143See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970), set out in note 92 supra.
144 See, e.g., NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967); J.I. Case Co.
v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1944).
145Cf. Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961) (collective interest
served by union acquiescence to discharge of employees for mishandling of money and
merchandise).
146 Friedman, Individual Rights in Grievance Arbitration, 27 ARB. J. 252, 253 (1972).
14 7
See note 86 supra.
148 See notes 191-96 and accompanying text infra.
149 See notes 197-98 and accompanying text infra.
150See, e.g., Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); People v. Wochnick,
98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P.2d 70 (1950); Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1953); State
v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325, 184 A.2d 225 (1962); People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d
503 (1942); State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945); Boeche v. State, 151 Neb.
368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949); State v. Trimble, 68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951). See also Burkey, Lie Detectors in Labor
Relations, 19 ARB. J. 193, 194-97 (1964). But see People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d
348 (Queens County Ct. 1938).
A veritable plethora of articles have discussed the merits of excluding or admitting lie
detector evidence. Some of the leading articles supporting exclusion are: Burkey, The Case
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bitration, 15 1 many arbitrators are similarly reluctant to consider
polygraph results. 15 2 Most arbitral opinions on the subject simply
1 53
adopt the judicial rule without much meaningful discussion.
Recent studies, however, seriously challenge the validity of the
polygraph exclusionary doctrine. 15 4 Scientific tests of polygraph
techniques consistently yield accuracy rates in excess of ninety-two
percent. 1 5 5 Moreover, a major portion of the "inaccurate" results involve "indeterminable" subjects who simply could not be evaluated. 15 6
Nevertheless, some writers argue that an employer should not
rely on polygraph results because they are fundamentally inconclusive. 1 5 7 The machine can only indicate the witness' perception of
Against the Polygraph, 51 A.B.A.J. 855 (1965); Highleyman, The Deceptive Certainty of the "Lie
Detector," 10 HASTINGS L.J. 47 (1958); Levin, Lie Detectors Can Lie!, 15 LAB. L.J. 708 (1964);
Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694
(1961); Sternbach, Gustafson & Colier, Don't Trust the Lie Detector, 40 HARV. Bus. REV.,
Nov./Dec. 1962, at 127. Articles favoring admission include: Pfaff, The Polygraph: An InvaluableJudicial Aid, 50 A.B.A.J. 1130 (1964); Wicker, The PolygraphicTruth Test and the Law
of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REV. 711 (1953); Note, The Role of the Polygraph in Our Judicial
System, 20 S.C. L. REV. 804 (1968); Note, The Polygraph Revisited: An Argument for
Admissibility, 4 SUFFOLK L. REV. 111 (1969).
151 See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
15'2See Bethlehem Steel Corp., 68 Lab. Arb. 581, 582-83 (1977) (Seward, Arb.); Grocers Supply Co., 59 Lab. Arb. 1280, 1284 (1972) (Taylor, Arb.); Bowman Transp., Inc., 59
Lab. Arb. 283, 287-91 (1972) (Murphy, Arb.); American Maize-Prods. Co., 45 Lab. Arb.
1155, 1158 (1965) (Epstein, Arb.); Saveway Inwood Serv. Station, 44 Lab. Arb. 709, 710-11
(1965) (Kornblum, Arb.); Louis Zahn Drug Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 352 (1963) (Sembower,
Arb.); Dayton Steel Foundry Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 745, 746-47 (1962) (Porter, Arb.); Continental Air Transp. Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 778, 780-81 (1962) (Eiger, Arb.); Brass-Craft Mfg.
Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 1177, 1182 (1961) (Kahn, Arb.); Marathon Elec. Mfg. Corp., 31 Lab.
Arb. 1040, 1041-42 (1959) (Duff, Arb.); Coronet Phosphate Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 515, 519-20
(1958) (Vadakin, Arb.).
'53E.g., American Maize-Prods. Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 1155, 1158 (1965) (Epstein, Arb.);
Marathon Elec. Mfg. Corp., 31 Lab. Arb. 1040, 1041-42 (1959) (Duff, Arb.).
'54 It is generally acknowledged that particular factors may adversely affect the diagnosis of a lie detector examination. Emotional tension, physiological and psychological abnormalities, unobserved muscular movements independently producing ambiguities in
blood pressure tracings, and simple unresponsiveness in a few subjects may render it difficult for an examiner to evaluate effectively the results of a specific test. Nevertheless,
when operated and evaluated by a fully qualified examiner, a modern lie detector device
may manifest substantial accuracy. See F. INBAU & J. REIn, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION 65-66 (1953).
155 See id. at 111. See also Blum & Osterloh, The Polygraph Examination as a Means for
Detecting Truth and Falsehood in Stories Presented by Police Informants, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
133 (1968); Davidson, Validity of the Guilty-Knowledge Technique: The Effects of Motivation, 52
J. APPLIED PSYCH. 62 (1968); Horvath & Reid, The Reliability of Polygraph Examhwr Diagnosis of Truth and Deception, 62 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 276 (1971); Lykken, The Validity of the
Guilty Knowledge Technique: The Effects of Faking, 44 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 258 (1960).
1"6 See, e.g., F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 154, at 111.
1'7 See Note, Lie Detectors in Private Employment, supra note 3, at 932-36.
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the truth of his statements; it cannot verify the accuracy of initial
perception nor reveal the tricks of memory. This criticism, however, is equally applicable to direct testimony. 5 8 Lie detector evidence should be admitted as long as the factfinder is aware that it
corroborates the honesty, but not the accuracy, of direct testimony.
Several courts have recently reconsidered the Draconian rule
established by the early lie detector cases.' 59 If ascertaining truth is
the principal function of adjudicatory bodies, 60 courts must acknowledge the assistance that lie detectors can provide.
If the judicial system is to fulfill its duty of searching for
truth and maintaining integrity, it must commence a war against
perjury. The war cannot be won with weapons restricted to
cross-examination, inferences from demeanor, and other relics
from the crossbow era of Henry II. The arsenal against sophisticated witness mendacity must be equipped with the most advanced, accomplished, and effective scientific system devised to
date. Unless we are interested in the preservation of institutionalized perjury, there is no tenable reason why qualified
polygraphers should not be welcomed by courts confronting credibility questions .... 161
Concerned with the problem of perjury, and recognizing the significant improvements that have been made in lie detector tech16 2
nology, many courts have agreed to admit polygraph evidence.
158 See Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, SCIENTIFIC AM., Dec. 1974, at 23. Regarding the
documented fallibility of eyewitness testimony, see generally E. BORCHARD & E. LuTZ,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); J. FRANK & B. FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957).
159 Regarding the unusual severity of the traditional standard, see Tarlow, Admissibility
of Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An Aid in Determining Credibility in a Perjury-PlaguedSystem, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 917, 937-41 (1975); Note, Lie Detectors in Private Employment, supra note 3, at
941; Note, supra note 129, at 343. Ballistics evidence, once held inadmissible along with lie
detector evidence because of lack of sufficient scientific acceptance (see People v. Berkman,
307 Ill. 492, 139 N.E. 91 (1923)), has long since been accorded judicial acceptability. See,
e.g., Goodall v. United States, 180 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 987 (1950).
160 See Forkosch, The Lie Detector and Mechanical Jurisprudence, 28 OKLA. L. REv. 288,
290 (1975); Sadoff, Psychiatric Involvement in the Search for Truth, 52 A.B.A.J. 251, 251
(1966). See also note 13 and accompanying text supra.
161 Tarlow, supra note 159, at 920 (footnotes omitted).
162 See, e.g., United States v. Penick, 496 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897
(1974); United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.), rev'd per curiam, 475 F.2d 1280
(D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972). But see
United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Frogge, 476
F.2d 969 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 849 (1973). See generally Tarlow, supra note 159, at
948 and nn.153 & 154; Note, The Emergence of the Polygraph at Trial, 73 COLtM. L. REV. 1120,
1128-36 (1973); Note, Pinocchio's New Nose, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 339, 342-45 (1973); Note,
supra note 129, at 343-45 (1973).
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Although the pace has been slow, labor arbitrators have moved
in a similar direction. Conventional security measures have proven
ineffective against modern, sophisticated methods of internal depredation. 16 3 Traditional evidentiary rules are no better at resolving credibility conflicts in the arbitral forum than they are in courts
of law. 1 64 Increased awareness of these problems has prompted
some arbitrators to consider polygraphic testimony as corroborative evidence in appropriate cases.' 65 My own view is that labor
arbitrators should recognize polygraph evidence as a significant
66
aid in resolving credibility disputes.
An arbitrator should not admit polygraph test results into evidence, however, unless one of two conditions is satisfied. The test
must either have been knowingly taken by the subject under circumstances warranting compulsory examination, or the worker
must have voluntarily agreed to undergo the particular examination in issue. When an employer claims that the test was taken
voluntarily, the arbitrator should make sure that the employee willingly and deliberately consented to the examination.
The circumstances surrounding the employee's agreement to
be tested determine the validity of his consent. For example, a
general pre-employment consent form authorizing the employer to
conduct polygraph tests whenever it deems it necessary should
16'

See Saveway Inwood Serv. Station, 44 Lab. Arb. 709, 710 (1965) (Kornblum, Arb.).

164 Anyone driven by the necessity of adjudging credibility, who has listened over

a number of years to sworn testimony, knows that as much truth must have been
uttered by shifty-eyed, perspiring, lip-licking, nail-biting, guilty-looking, ill at ease,
fidgity witnesses as have lies issued from calm, collected, imperturbable, urbane,
straight-in-the-eye perjurers.
Jones, supra note 16, at 1286.
165 See Daystrom Furniture Co., 65 Lab. Arb. 1157, 1160-62 (undated) (Laughlin,
Arb.); Bowman Transp., Inc., 64 Lab. Arb. 453, 454-57 (1975) (Hon, Arb.); American
Maize-Prods. Co., 56 Lab. Arb. 421, 423-25 (1971) (Larkin, Arb.); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 450, 453 (1964) (Singletary, Arb.); Wilkof Steel & Supply Co., 39 Lab.
Arb. 883, 884-85 (1962) (Maxwell, Arb.); Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 470, 478-79
(1962) (Ryder, Arb.). Cf. Seaview Indus., Inc., 39 Lab. Arb. 125, 127-28 (1962) (Duncan,
Arb.) (testimony of handwriting expert deemed conclusive). See also Fleming, supra note
16, at 165, regarding unreported cases that have considered polygraph evidence. Lie
detector results have also been admitted to corroborate the innocence of an alleged offender. See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 48 Lab. Arb. 1089, 1090-91 (1967) (Doyle,
Arb.). See also Indianapolis Transit Sys., Inc., 31 Lab. Arb. 433, 436 (1958) (McIntosh,
Arb.).
166 The arbitration process is more conducive to the fair evaluation of such evidence
than are courts, since arbitration proceedings rely on professional adjudicators rather than
neophyte jurors who are more likely to be awed by polygraph evidence. See Bowman
Transp., Inc., 59 Lab. Arb. 283, 291 (1972) (Murphy, Arb.).
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never be accepted. Such a waiver is not truly voluntary, since a
prospective employee is too likely to view it-as a prerequisite of
employment.' 67 Other documents granting relatively unlimited
consent should also be rejected. A lie detector examination is so
intrusive and so potentially damaging that one would not ordinarily grant blanket consent unless his employment status was in
jeopardy.
The arbitrator should also take into account the alleged involvement of the witness in the defalcation under investigation. If
the proffered test was administered to an impartial witness not
implicated in the alleged misconduct, there is little reason to suspect the validity of consent to the examination. The results of the
test should be considered for admission as evidence. In contrast,
polygraph evidence obtained from either the grievant or another
worker under suspicion should be treated more cautiously. 68 The
subject may have consented out of fear for his job, 6 9 or he may
70
have been under extreme social pressure from other employees.
Where consent was extracted under such circumstances, the results
of the test should not be admitted. The fundamental right of the
subject to be free from such nonconsensual intrusions' 7 ' should
take precedence over any evidentiary benefits that might be derived from the polygraph. Likewise, a worker's refusal to submit to
a lie detector test would generally not constitute probative evidence
of that worker's culpability for the misconduct under investi167 See

Note, Lie Detectors in Private Employment, supra note 3, at 947-48. See also Lag

Drug Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 1121, 1122-23 (1962) (Kelliher, Arb.) (individual waivers inconsistent with employer's obligation to deal with workers through representative labor organization).
168 If a prospective examinee reasonably believes that adverse consequences might result from a proposed polygraph examination, he is entitled to union representation during
the pre-examination discussions and the adminstration of the test, provided that he asks
for such representation. This right is provided under the NLRA (see notes 76-79, 135, and
accompanying text supra) and some applicable contract principles (see notes 106-13 and
accompanying text supra). But cf. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 55 Lab. Arb. 994, 995 (1970)
(Seward, Arb.) (no right to union representation before employer administers test for intoxication). The presence of a union representative during the critical pre-examination
period may prove important because it significantly increases the likelihood of a determination that the employee's consent to the test was properly elicited.
169 Cf. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 (1966) (statements elicited under
threat of discharge from public employment inadmissible in subsequent criminal trial because involuntary and thus violative of privilege against self-incrimination). See also Aldens,
Inc., 77-1 LAB. ARB. AWARDS 8013, at 3061-62 (1976) (Seitz, Arb.).
170 See B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 552, 558 (1961) (Ryder, Arb.).
171See notes 178-79 and accompanying text infra.
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Finally, the arbitrator must consider the qualifications of the
expert administering the test. Polygraph examiners range from
professionally competent individuals who rarely err to rank amateurs who are little more than charlatans' 7 3 Obviously, the results
74
of only an expertly administered test should be admissible.'
Moreover, given the present state of the art, no lie detector test
75
should be regarded as conclusive proof of guilt.'

Lie detector examinations can have a significant impact upon
an adjudication independent of the test results themselves. The
machines frequently have a psychological effect upon examinees,
precipitating confessions of guilt.' 7

6

If the arbitrator is satisfied

that such a confession was given voluntarily, he should consider it
as evidence of culpability,' 7 7 provided that it was elicited during a
proper polygraph test. Where the confession resulted from an improper, involuntary examination, however, it should be rejected
outright to ensure that the company does not derive any benefit
from its inappropriate conduct.
172 National Elec. Coil, 46 Lab. Arb. 756, 761 (1966) (Gross, Arb.); Sanna Dairies, Inc.,
43 Lab. Arb. 16, 18 (1964) (Rice, Arb.); Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 470, 479 (1962)
(Ryder, Arb.); Publishers' Ass'n of N.Y. City, 32 Lab. Arb. 44, 48-49 (1959) (Simkin, Arb.).
But cf. Cal Custom/Hawk, 65 Lab. Arb. 723, 727 (1975) (Ross, Arb.) (refusal to take blood
test evidence of intoxication). See also R. FLEMING, supra note 54, at 195; Silving, Testing the
Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HARV. L. REV. 683, 693 (1956); note 54 and accompanying
text supra.
1'3See F. BAILEY, THE DEFENSE NEVER RESTS 16-17 (1971). Reliability of polygraph
testing would be greatly enhanced if state licensing requirements established meaningful
minimum standards for qualified examiners. See note 125 and accompanying text supra.
174 See, e.g., Spiegel, Inc., 44 Lab. Arb. 405, 407-09 (1965) (Sembower, Arb.). "The
machine and its component parts are only as good as the person performing the tests, and
the value of the findings is the result of the experience, qualifications or inexperience of
the operator of the machine." Burkey, Lie Detectors in Labor Relations, 19 ARB. J. 193, 205
(1964) (quoting South Center Dep't Stores (1958) (Luskin, Arb.) (unpublished opinion)).
175 See B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 552, 556-57 (1961) (Ryder, Arb.); Note,
Pinocchio's New Nose, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 339, 364 (1973).
If an employer obtains polygraph results that appear to exculpate the accused, it is
arguably obligated to divulge that information to the labor union representing the grievant, at least if requested to do so. See generally NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432
(1967); United States v. Hart, 344 F. Supp. 522, 523-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (prosecution required to inform defense of polygraph results casting doubt on credibility of prosecution
witnesses). See also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
176 See Note, Lie Detectors in Private Employment, supra note 3, at 938.
177 Cf. United States v. McDevitt, 328 F.2d 282, 284 (6th Cir. 1964) (confession elicited
during polygraph test admissible as long as it is voluntary).
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C. Right of Employer To Require Lie Detector Examinations
1. Fundamental Considerations
Opponents of compulsory lie detector examinations in private
industry argue that the practice violates each worker's basic right to
human dignity and privacy. 1 78 They contend that it involves an
unconscionable intrusion into personal thoughts, attitudes, and
beliefs. 17 9 Polygraph critics also assert that compulsory interrogation would alter the nature of the adjudicative process from adversarial to inquisitorial.' 8 0
[J]udicial procedure must be adversary and not inquisitorial....
... Surely, there can be neither justice nor dignity in finding
the innocent guilty and the guilty innocent. But in the administration of justice, truth is but a means, whereas dignity is an end.

The issue before us is whether we are to abandon our traditional system of adversary litigation with emphasis upon dignity
for "scientific" trial with emphasis upon truth.' 8 '
Despite the obvious appeal of such a simplistic dichotomy, it
must be realized that adjudicative procedures have been directly
affected by the discovery and development of scientific techniques.
Expert testimony relating to fingerprints, blood tests, and handwriting analyses is commonplace today, even though such evidence
effectively requires the accused to provide evidence against himself. As the Supreme Court recognized in Breithaupt v. Abram,' 82 a
case involving the involuntary extraction of blood from a suspected
drunken driver, there must necessarily come a time when "the interests of society in the scientific determination" of culpability outweigh "so slight an intrusion" into a person's body. 8 3 There may
similarly come a time where the substantial interests of an em178 See A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 237-39; Note, Lie Detectors in Private Employment,

supra note 3, at 944-46; Note, supra note 1, at 106. See also Burkey, Privacy, Property and the
Polygraph, 18 LAB. L.J. 79, 89 (1967); Markson, supra note 118, at 405-06.
179 See A. LEMOND & R. FRY, supra note 3, at 130.
1M0See Silving, supra note 172, at 687-702.
181 Id. at 687, 700, 702.
182 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
183 Id. at 439.
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184
ployer will take precedence over the worker's right of privacy.
In attempting to establish appropriate limitations upon a
company's right to require polygraph examinations, the arbitrator
must consider the deleterious impact such procedures can have
upon overall employer-employee relations. "Employees may view
the tests as an indication of management suspicion and distrust.
Such beliefs may create an atmosphere of hostility and an unfavorable working environment."' 185 Failure to resolve a serious disciplinary matter, however, can have similarly destructive consequences.
As one arbitrator has stated, "when suspicions are kindled it seems
better to bring the matter to a head, one way or the other, rather
to
than to risk the greater harm of misdirected doubts smoldering
86
held."'
be
might
person
char the esteem in which an innocent
In balancing the competing considerations, most arbitrators
have taken the view that an employee's refusal to submit to such an
examination does not provide a reasonable basis for the imposition
of discipline.' 8 7 A few arbitrators have decided to the contrary,
however, in situations where there was sufficient independent
evidence to create a reasonable suspicion that the employee had
engaged in the misconduct under investigation.18 8 Although this
latter position currently represents the minority sentiment, it is entirely defensible.

2. Suggested Approach
Although some arbitrators have indicated that a representative
labor organization may, through collective negotiations, obligate an

fifth amendment principles are not binding upon the arbitration process
accompanying text supra), the interest of an employer can take priority
and
62-65
(see notes
over the self-incrimination concerns of an individual worker in appropriate cases. See Note,
184 Because

Lie Detectors in PrivateEmployment, supra note 3, at 949-52.
185 Note, supra note 1, at 102 (footnote omitted). See Note, Lie Detectors in Private Employment, supra note 3, at 938.
186 Attwood Corp., 48 Lab. Arb. 331, 334 (1967) (Keefe, Arb.).
187See Bowman Transp. Co., 60 Lab. Arb. 837, 838 (1973) (Hardy, Arb.); Simoniz Co.,

44 Lab. Arb. 658, 662 (1964) (McGury, Arb.); Skaggs-Stone, Inc., 40 Lab. Arb. 1273, 1279
(1963) (Koven, Arb.); Town & Country Food Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 332, 335 (1962) (Lewis,
Arb.). See also Chapman Harbor Convalescent Hosp., 64 Lab. Arb. 27, 28 (1975) (Neblett,
Arb.); United Mills, Inc., 39 Lab. Arb. 1259, 1261 (1963) (Miller, Arb.).
188See Bowman Transp., Inc., 61 Lab. Arb. 549, 555-57 (1973) (Laughlin, Arb.); Allen
Indus., Inc., 26 Lab. Arb. 363, 369-70 (1956) (Klamon, Arb.). See also Warwick Elec., Inc.,
46 Lab. Arb. 95, 97-98 (1966) (Daugherty, Arb.); B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 36 Lab. Arb.
552, 556 (1961) (Ryder, Arb.).
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employee to undergo lie detector tests, 189 my view is that the vital
individual rights involved are too substantial to permit union waiver. Since an employer's implementation of a lie detection program
ordinarily constitutes a mandatory subject for collective bargaining
within the purview of the NLRA, 190 it is undoubtedly appropriate
for a negotiated agreement to restrict the authority of a company to
require such examinations. However, no contractual provision
should be permitted to expand an employer's prerogative to require
tests. A union should not be allowed to relinquish the basic personal rights of its members.' 9 '
Mandatory lie detector examinations should be countenanced
only when all of the following conditions exist: (1) serious employee misconduct is suspected, involving a substantial threat to
production, discipline, or safety; (2) less drastic investigative techniques have been either unsuccessfully attempted or rejected as
unworkable under the particular circumstances; 192 (3) the employer has accumulated sufficient independent evidence to create a
reasonable suspicion that the worker in question possesses relevant
information that he has refused to disclose voluntarily. 93 Even
where a compulsory lie detector test is appropriate, the scope of
inquiry should be as narrow as possible. Although the polygraph
operator may have to ask personal questions not directly related to
the present employment context for the purpose of calibrating the
machine, none of the responses to such questions should be disclosed to management officials or other parties. Only answers di-

189See Warwick Elec., Inc., 46 Lab. Arb. 95, 97-98 (1966) (Daugherty, Arb.). See also
Town & Country Food Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 332, 335 (1962) (Lewis, Arb.).
19 0 See notes 139-41 and accompanying text supra.
191Cf. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974) (employees' collective bargaining
agent may not waive their rights to form, join, or assist labor organizations). Where a
collective bargaining agreement appears to enlarge management's right to compel polygraph tests, an arbitrator can effectively neutralize the provision by deciding that the 'just
cause" section of the contract prohibits disciplining employees who refuse to submit to
unwarranted compulsory examinations. See Meat Cutters Local 540 v. Neuhoff Bros. Packers, Inc., 481 F.2d 817, 820 (5th Cir. 1973).
192Cf. Pilgrim Liquor, Inc., 66 Lab. Arb. 19, 23 (1975) (Fleischli, Arb.) (employer required to show impossibility of less drastic means before requiring employees to sign fidelity bonds). See also A. WESTIN,supra note 4, at 372.
193See Bowman Transp., Inc., 61 Lab. Arb. 549, 555 (1973) (Laughlin, Arb.); General
Am. Transp. Corp., 31 Lab. Arb. 355, 363 (1958) (Sembower, Arb.). Cf. Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 441, 444 (1968) (Koven, Arb.) (employer's use of fingerprint test to
corroborate prior investigation held proper). See also Comment, The Polygraph and Labor
Arbitration, 19 SYRACUSE L. REv. 684, 691 (1968).
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rectly related to the specific misconduct necessitating the examination should be divulged, and only to appropriate persons.' 9 4
The protections proposed herein should be meaningfully enforced by both arbitrators, through the decisional process, and
legislatures, through the enactment of appropriate statutory restrictions. Whenever an employer has disciplined a worker for refusing to submit to an unwarranted lie detector examination, the
arbitrator should nullify the penalty; such reasonable employee
conduct should not be considered 'Just cause" for the imposition of
discipline. 195 Furthermore, no information obtained from an improper test should be admitted into evidence. 196
State legislatures should prohibit all pre-employment lie detector examinations and all employer-solicited polygraph tests of a
general or recurring nature. Such tests are inherently coercive and
offer little information useful for security purposes. 197 State
enactments should provide for appropriate civil and criminal redress for improper testing, but should encourage resort to the
labor arbitration process by requiring exhaustion of available arbitral procedures as a prerequisite to civil action. An arbitrator's
resolution of the matter should be considered conclusive unless
clearly erroneous or procedurally defective. Finally, states should
194 The examinee should be informed of the proposed questions before the test so that
inappropriate inquiries can be challenged and withdrawn prior to the examinations. See
Note, Pinocchio's New Nose, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 339, 355 (1973). The subject should, upon
request, be provided with the detailed conclusions of the polygraph examiner. Cf. NLRB
v. Detroit Edison Co., 4 LAB. L. REP. (82 Lab. Cas.) 10,062 (6th Cir. 1977) (union entitled
to results of psychological tests used by employer to determine promotions).
195 Cf. Meat Cutters Local 540 v. Neuhoff Bros. Packers, Inc., 481 F.2d 817, 820 (5th
Cir. 1973) (agreement not specifying particular grounds for discharge held to leave interpretation of "proper cause" to arbitrator).
196 State statutes covering this area should specifically preclude the admission of improperly obtained test results before any public or private adjudicatory tribunal; otherwise,
arbitrators might consider such evidence even if obtained in violation of state law. See
Daystrom Furniture Co., 65 Lab. Arb. 1157, 1160-62 (undated) (Laughlin, Arb.).
197 Pre-employment testing that is not clearly "job related" could provide a rejected
minority group applicant with a cause of action for employment discrimination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970)). Cf. Green v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1293-99 (8th Cir. 1975) (proof that employment practice disqualified
blacks at substantially higher rate than whites established prima facie case of discrimination); Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631, 632 (9th Cir. 1972) (requirement that
each job applicant reveal arrest record held to discriminate against blacks). See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971). But see 2 EMPL. PAc. GUIDE 6519 (Oct. 29, 1974) (EEOC decision) (no racial
discrimination in violation of Title VII where black worker discharged for failing polygraph test given equally to all employees).

19771

INQUISITORIAL PROCESS IN EMPLOYMENT

extend the fundamental protections of the arbitration process to
1 98
unorganized workers.
IV
EMPLOYMENT SEARCHES

It is not uncommon for employers to present at arbitration
proceedings evidence that has been obtained through a search of
an employee's person or effects. In some cases employers receive
such evidence from police officers who have uncovered it during a
search pursuant to a criminal investigation. In other cases, employers obtain evidence through searches conducted on company
premises.
A.

Searches Conducted by the Police
The most common issue presented to arbitrators confronted
with evidence obtained from a police search is whether the admissibility of the evidence should hinge on the propriety of the search
under the fourth amendment. 1 99 Some arbitrators have concluded
that the exclusionary rule, which precludes using impermissibly
seized evidence in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the
search, 20 0 should logically be applied in arbitration hearings to
prevent the admission of evidence obtained through police misconduct.
Although the Fourth Amendment applies to governmental action, and not the unlawful seizure of private pipers by private
persons, 20° 11 we are not confronted in the instant case with a
private seizure .

.

. but rather a situation where a private em-

19" See Summers, supra note 24,

at 519-31.
'99 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
200 See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914).
201Where evidence is unlawfully seized by a private person not acting as a governmental agent, courts have generally held that the exclusionary rule does not preclude judicial
consideration of the evidence in a proceeding involving different parties. See Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1921). See generally MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 168, at 372 & n.50 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). See also United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433, 455 n.31 (1976).
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ployer seeks to justify its disciplinary action almost entirely upon
a tainted transaction, in the form of an adjudicated unlawful
search and seizure by governmental action. If equity is proper
for the Arbitrator's consideration the "clean hands" maxim requires consideration, for equity will never assist the harsh assertion of legal rights. Moreover, the constitutional protection
against unlawful search and seizure is of little value if evidence
ordered suppressed may be recaptured by public authorities and
202
used against an accused in a collateral proceeding ....
Arbitrators who apply the exclusionary rule evidently believe that
its purpose is to protect the individual who is the victim of a
wrongful search. Such is not the case. "The rule is calculated to
prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
''2 °3 The sole
way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.
issue
for consideration, therefore, is whether excluding illegally seized
evidence from arbitration proceedings has any deterrent effect.
In my view, arbitral exclusion of evidence obtained by improper police conduct does not deter employer excesses, since employers
are not directly involved in police searches. Nor does exclusion act
as an effective deterrent to unconstitutional behavior by the police,
who are primarily concerned with the criminal prosecution of law
violators-not private punishment for employee misconduct. If the
threat of evidentiary exclusion in the criminal context does not
deter police misconduct, 20 4 then surely the remote prospect of exclusion from a private collateral proceeding will have no meaningful impact. It is for this very reason that the Supreme Court has
never applied the exclusionary rule to civil adjudications.20 5
Finally, the equities of the private employment setting require
the admission of any probative and reliable evidence of employee
misconduct that has not been obtained through wrongful employer
202 Congoleum-Nairn, Inc., 63-2 Lab. Arb. Awards
8843, at 5726-27 (1963) (Short,
Arb.). See also Imperial Glass Corp., 61 Lab. Arb. 1180, 1182-83 (1973) (Gibson, Arb.);
Aldens, Inc., 58 Lab. Arb. 1213, 1214-16 (1972) (McGury, Arb.).
203 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). See United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961). As pointed out by
the Court in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), "[t]he ruptured privacy of the
victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late." Id. at 637.
204 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 413-18 (1971) (dissenting
opinion, Burger, C.J.).
205 See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1976). See generally Comment, The
Applicability of the Exclusionay Rule to Civil Cases, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 263 (1967).
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acts. The detection and punishment of employee misconduct is in
the interests of both labor and management.2 0 6 Fundamental fairness requires that totally innocent parties not be penalized for the
wrongful acts of others. To the extent that a worker is truly aggrieved by police misconduct, his proper remedy lies in exclusion
of the evidence from any criminal prosecution and civil redress
against those responsible for the illegal search.20 7
B.

Searches of Workers Entering or Leaving Company Premises

Although many industrial searches are intended to discover
evidence pertaining to specific employee misconduct suspected by
an employer, some inspections are primarily preventive rather
than accusatory.2 0 8 Some companies, for example, conduct regular
examinations of employees as they enter and leave the premises to
prevent the introduction of contraband into the plant or the theft
209
of company property.
Entrance and exit inspections may be analogized to international border searches. The Supreme Court has expressly recognized the inherent authority of a sovereign nation to conduct such
examinations without complying with the probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment. 2 10 Arbitrators have similarly acknowledged the right of employers to perform reasonable searches
206 "Jurists and scholars uniformly have recognized that the exclusionary rule imposes
a substantial cost on the societal interest in law enforcement by its proscription of what
concededly is relevant evidence." United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1976). "If
. . . the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use
...is unwarranted." Id. at 454. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485-89 (1976).
Arbitrators who reject the exclusionary rule, however, do so not on policy grounds,
but on the ground that the fourth amendment is simply not applicable to arbitration. See
Aldens, Inc., 61 Lab. Arb. 663, 664-66 (1973) (Dolnick, Arb.); Commodity Warehousing
Corp., 60 Lab. Arb. 1260, 1262-63 (1973) (Doppelt, Arb.); Hennis Freight Lines, 44 Lab.
Arb. 711, 713-14 (1964) (McGury, Arb.). See also notes 218-21 and accompanying text infra.
207 Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1970) (upholding civil
action for damages against federal narcotics agents who violated fourth amendment).
208 See Silard, supra note 54, at 22 1.
209 From my own observations, companies seem more likely to use exit inspections
than entrance inspections, presumably because there is usually a greater potential for loss
from employee theft than from the admittance of contraband into the employment environment.
210 See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973). See also United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 884 (1975). The right to search pertains to borders and their "functional equivalents,"
such as international airline terminals. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
272-73 (1973).
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of employees and their belongings as they enter 211 or leave 2 12 the
work premises, particularly where there are bona fide reasons for
the practice.2 1 3 Generally speaking, the security procedure must be
one that is clearly established, fairly administered, and understood
by all workers. If an arbitrator determines that an inspection rule
has been arbitrarily applied,2 1 4 or has been promulgated in a manner which has not sufficiently apprised the workers of their obligations thereunder, 2 15 he may order the rescission or modification of
any disciplinary action taken against employees who failed to cooperate in the search.
If an employer's inspection program is not used to obtain information about statutorily protected activities of workers and is
not applied in a discriminatory manner to inhibit the exercise of
secured rights, the program should encounter no immediate problems under the NLRA.21 6 Since inspection programs usually have a
significant impact upon fundamental working conditions, however,
they probably constitute a mandatory subject for collective bargaining. An employer is thus obligated to afford the representative
labor organization an opportunity to negotiate both over the proposed implementation of such a program 217 and over any contractual limitations it deems appropriate. The same considerations
apply to searches conducted on the general premises of a company.
C. Searches Conducted on General Emplo)ment Premises
The Supreme Court has unequivocally recognized that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches does not
211 See Fruehauf Corp., 49 Lab. Arb. 89, 90-91 (1967) (Daugherty, Arb.). See also Wisconsin Steel Coal Mines, 67 Lab. Arb. 84, 86-87 (1976) (Volz, Arb.); Dow Chem. Co., 65
Lab. Arb. 1295, 1297 (1976) (Lipson, Arb.); Scott Paper Co., 52 Lab. Arb. 57, 58 (1969)
(Williams, Arb.).
212 See Dow Chem. Co., 65 Lab. Arb. 1295, 1297-98 (1976) (Lipson, Arb.); Friedrich
Refrigerators, Inc., 39 Lab. Arb. 934, 935 (1962) (Williams, Arb.). See also Scott Paper Co.,
52 Lab. Arb. 57, 58 (1969) (Williams, Arb.).
213 For example, an employer may wish to prevent employees from drinking alcohol
while on the job (see Fruehauf Corp., 49 Lab. Arb. 89 (1967) (Daugherty, Arb.)), or to
prevent the theft of company property (see Dow Chem. Co., 65 Lab. Arb. 1295 (1976)
Arb.)).
(Lipson,
2 14
See Anchor Hocking Corp., 66 Lab. Arb. 480, 481 (1976) (Emerson, Arb.). In conducting these searches, the employer must be circumspect. If the employer seeks an obviously excessive intrusion, the subject of the proposed search should have the right to decline without being exposed to the possibility of discipline.
215 See Dow Chem. Co., 65 Lab. Arb. 1295, 1297, 1299 (1976) (Lipson, Arb.).
216 See generally notes 36-41 and accompanying text supra.
217 See generally notes 139-42 and accompanying text supra.
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apply to wholly private conduct: "[t]he Fourth Amendment... was
intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority,
and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies. '2 18 Although some commentators have argued
that the constitutional restriction should be judicially extended to
cover institutionalized private intrusions performed on a regular
basis by company security agents, 2 19 courts have generally rejected
such an approach, 220 as have most labor arbitrators. 22 1 Nevertheless, arbitration decisions have imposed some limitations upon the
right of management to search employees and their private belongings.,
The right of management to carry out employment searches
under certain circumstances is generally acknowledged. As long as
the employees are fully informed of their obligations under security rules, a company may even prescribe compliance with them
as a condition of continued employment. 2 22 Thus, where a carefully defined management rule required workers to permit inspections of large purses brought into the employment environment,
the arbitrator sustained the discharge of an employee who refused
to allow a search of her pocketbook. 22 3 In addition, certain employee privileges may be made contingent upon the right of the
employer to perform security inspections. For example, provision
of locker space to workers can be conditioned on a management
224
right to inspect locker contents at any time.
Company rules requiring employees to submit themselves and
their personal property to security examinations as a condition of
employment should be unambiguous, and should be narrowly construed to avoid unnecessary and unanticipated intrusions upon
218 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). See generally Note, Seizures by Private Parties:Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19 STAN. L. REv. 608 (1967).
21 See Note, supra note 218, at 614-17.
220 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 153 Cal. App. 2d 870, 873-78, 315 P.2d 468, 469-73
(1957).
221 See Smith's Food King, 66 Lab. Arb. 619, 625 (1976) (Ross, Arb.); Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 27 Lab. Arb. 709, 711-12 (1956) (Maggs, Arb.). See also R. FLEMING, supra note
54, at 189.
222 See R. FLEMING, supra note 54, at 189.

223 Aldens, Inc., 51 Lab. Arb. 469, 470-71 (1968) (Kelliher, Arb.).
'24 See Thrifty Drug Stores Co., 64 Lab. Arb. 997 (1975) (Fellman, Arb.). At least one
arbitrator has upheld locker searches under the employer's contractual right to provide a
safe working environment and maintain efficient operations. Rocky Mountain Arsenal, 64
Lab. Arb. 894 (1975) (Murphy, Arb.). Such an interpretation seems faulty, however, since
this contractual right does not confer unlimited search powers on the employer.
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worker privacy. 22 5 Before conducting a search of an employee or
his personal effects, an employer should always try to obtain the
worker's permission. 2 6 This procedure can prevent many unnecessary confrontations. If an arbitrator is satisfied that an employee willingly acquiesced to an employment search, the fruits of
that exercise should be admitted into evidence. The worker's consent should, however, be genuine-not the product of employer
22 7
deception.
Even where worker consent is refused and there are no properly promulgated rules specifically authorizing an inspection, an
employer may still be entitled to conduct an examination.2 2 8 "Many
arbitrators would permit companies to use evidence obtained without the knowledge or consent of the employee if it is obtained from
company property (e.g., a locker), even though the property is
momentarily under the control of the employee. ' 22 9 This is particularly true where management has sufficient information to
create a reasonable suspicion that contraband or misappropriated
company property is located in the employee's locker.23 0 If no such
presupposition exists, however, the immediate proprietary interest
of the worker in his personal belongings should take precedence
over the employer's ownership right, and a search should not be
23
permitted. '
Some employers may claim, as part of their contractual right
to maintain a safe and healthful work environment, the inherent
225 See Carlson & Phillips, supra note 14, at 541. Arbitrators have sometimes limited
permissible searches to those specifically covered by express company rules. See Scott Paper
Co., 52 Lab. Arb. 57, 58-59 (1969) (Williams, Arb.). Such rulings are unnecessarily restrictive, in view of the inherent right of an employer to take necessary security precautions.
226 See Ross-Meehan Foundries, 55 Lab. Arb. 1078, 1080 (1970) (King, Arb.).
227 At least one arbitrator has upheld a consensual search that was actually procured
through deception. See Weirton Steel Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 103, 104-05 (1968) (Kates, Arb.).
See also note 51 supra. If an employee's acquiescence is procured by a material misrepresentation, however, an arbitrator should view the deceptive inducement as grounds for vitiating the consent.
228 To avoid the intimidating atmosphere indigenous to employment searches, an employer should have a union representative present during such procedures. Furthermore,
if an employee requests the presence of a union steward during such an investigation,
reasonably believing that it might culminate in adverse consequences, the logic of Weingarten should mandate protection under the NLRA. See notes 71-77 and accompanying text
supra.
229 R. FLEMING, supra note 54, at 189.
230 See International Nickel Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 65, 66-68 (1967) (Shister, Arb.). See also

unreported arbitration decisions discussed in R. FLEMING, supra note 54, at 187-88.
231See Campbell Soup Co., 2 Lab. Arb. 27, 31 (1946) (Lohman, Arb.). But see note 224
and accompanying text supra.
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authority to make regular inspections of all lockers or similar company-owned receptacles. However, the inference of such a general
power to conduct searches is inappropriate. 232 Only where specific employment rules have been promulgated to regulate search
procedures should regular inspections be permitted. Otherwise,
searches should be allowed only where the employer can demonstrate a reasonable suspicion indicating the need for an inspection;
and even then, the scope of the search-e.g., the
number or loca233
tion of lockers-should be judiciously defined.
An employer should have even less authority to examine a
worker's belongings that are not situated in a company container.
Management should clearly not be permitted to obtain evidence
through nonconsensual searches of employees or of their personal
property merely because they are located on plant premises. 2 34 On
the other hand, where serious misconduct is suspected and less
intrusive investigative measures have not proved successful, a company should have the limited right to search an employee or his
personal property situated on the business grounds, assuming that
the employer has probable cause to believe that relevant evidence
2 35
will be uncovered.
Once an arbitrator has determined that an employer has conducted an impermissible search, he must decide how that violation
should be rectified. Some have argued that all improperly procured evidence should be excluded from arbitral considei-ation.2 36
2a3See note 224 supra.
233 Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (fourth amendment bars prosecution of person who refused to permit warrantless housing-code-enforcement inspection
of his residence).
234 See R. FLEMING, supra note 54, at 189. See also notes 208-15 and accompanying text
supra.
235 See. e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co., 68 Lab. Arb. 702, 705-06 (1977) (Casselman,
Arb.); Orgill Bros. & Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 307, 308-11 (1976) (Ross, Arb.). In Orgill, the
arbitrator sustained the termination of the grievant for refusing to submit to a search
where probable cause for the requested intrusion was clearly established. He indicated that
any other result would have made it advantageous for an employee in such circumstances
to refuse to cooperate. Id. at 311. See also Smith's Food King, 66 Lab. Arb. 619, 625 (1976)
(Ross, Arb.).
Parties might avoid many of the problems associated with such employment searches
by establishing a procedure in which the employer could seek a presearch authorization
from an arbitrator based upon an ex parte demonstration of probable cause. This practice
could easily be implemented where a permanent umpire system is in effect, but it might
encounter difficulty where parties only utilize ad hoc arbitrators. A possible solution would
be to authorize and specify a neutral to act in this capacity. This procedure would afford
significant protection to both workers and their employer.
236 See Campbell Soup Co., 2 Lab. Arb. 27, 31 (1946) (Lohman, Arb.). See also R.
FLEMING, supra note 54, at 190; Silard, supra note 54, at 225-26.
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Such a per se application of the exclusionary rule, however, is
unwarranted. An arbitration hearing is primarily a search for the
truth, 23 7 and it should not be utilized as a vehicle for punishing
transgressing employers. 23 8 It is best to seek an accommodation
that does not permit the clearly guilty worker to escape punishment simply because of a management error, but that affords him
239
a remedy for injury caused by an improper company intrusion.
Arbitrators should recognize an implied covenant in collective
bargaining agreements acknowledging the fundamental right of
employees to be free from unreasonable management encroachments. Where this covenant is breached, a reasonable award of
monetary damages is appropriate.2 4 ° It may also be proper in some
cases to modify the discipline imposed upon the aggrieved worker.
However, where the employer acts in good faith on a mistaken
belief in its authority to conduct the search in question, any information procured should be admitted into evidence. In such cases,
exclusion of the evidence would serve no meaningful purpose,
since any deterrent effect upon persons acting in good faith would
clearly be de minimis. 2 4 1 If the arbitral evidence establishes that the
grievant is in fact guilty of such gross misconduct that it would be
unreasonable to order his reinstatement, his termination should be
sustained despite any employer misconduct. Suitable monetary relief should be separately awarded to remedy the improper search.
Only where the employer-employee relationship has not been irreparably destroyed by the worker's misconduct should the arbitrator consider a modification of a discharge penalty because of an
impermissible but good faith search.
Where an employer has obtained evidence through deliberate
disregard for the fundamental rights of the affected employee,
however, that evidence, and the direct fruits thereof, should not be
considered in an arbitration hearing as part of the employer's
231 See Comment, supra note 205, at 275; notes 21-31 and accompanying text supra.
238 See Comment, supra note 205, at 275.
239 Compared to a criminal court judge who is empowered only to determine the guilt
or innocence of the criminal defendant, an arbitrator is in a unique position because he is
authorized in the same proceeding to consider what relief should be ordered to alleviate a
wrong perpetrated against the grievant by his accuser.
140 In the final analysis, any discipline imposed as a result of an improper search is a
consequence of the employee's own prior misconduct, not the search itself. An award of
monetary damages should therefore not take into account the financial loss sustained by
the worker due to the discipline imposed on him.
241See generally notes 200-06 and accompanying text supra.
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case-in-chief against the worker.2 4 2 A company must not be permitted to benefit from its own intentional misconduct. Exclusion of
the improperly obtained evidence is the only effective deterrent to
similar action in the future. Suppression in such cases would also
prevent the arbitration process from becoming unduly tainted by
the admission of evidence procured in an unconscionable fashion.
V
SURREPTITIOUS SURVEILLANCE

In an effort to discover and deter internal depredations, private employers are continually seeking more efficient surveillance
techniques. Supervisors and regular security personnel are engaging in furtive observation practices with increasing frequency. Employers are hiring undercover agents to infiltrate the work environment. Many companies are using sophisticated photographic
and eavesdropping equipment enabling management to observe
and overhear everything occurring in the plant. These procedures
all create complex issues for both arbitrators and the Labor Board.
A.

Furtive Supervisory Activities

"It is generally recognized that the employer may exercise
reasonable managerial rights of supervision even though this may
not be specifically set forth in the parties' agreement. '243 In addition to this general supervisory authority, management has the
right to conduct special surveillance of a specific worker on the
basis of previously developed suspicions. If incriminating information is obtained, the employer can impose an appropriate penalty,
and can use the evidence in a subsequent arbitration proceeding to
support its disciplinary action.2 4 4
The surreptitious nature of some surveillance techniques does
not usually diminish their propriety. For example, arbitrators have
considered evidence obtained by management officials hidden in
242 However, if the grievant presents direct testimony in his own behalf that is wholly
inconsistent with the information derived from the improper search, the evidence procured from that search should be admitted by the arbitrator solely for the purpose of
impeaching the grievant's testimony. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
243Scheiber, supra note 19, at 695. See Picker X-Ray Corp., 39 Lab. Arb. 1245, 1246
(1962) (Kates, Arb.). See also F & M Schaefer Brewing Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 199, 200 (1963)
(Turkus, Arb.).
244See Aro, Inc., 70-1 Lab. Arb. Awards
8278 (1969) (Cayton, Arb.); Chrysler Corp.,
53 Lab. Arb. 1279, 1280 (1969) (Alexaftder, Arb.).
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locations from which they could observe the activities of suspect
employees.2 45 One arbitrator has deemed it appropriate for supervisory personnel to conduct unannounced off-plant investigations
of employees who were apparently over-extending their authorized
24 6
lunch break.
Despite this expansive management authority to conduct surveillance, the NLRA prescribes some basic limitations. It is clear
that employers may scrutinize unprotected work activities; 24 7 if
employers attempt to review protected endeavors, however, unfair
labor practice liability is likely to result. 24 8 A violation has also been
found where an employer subjected workers to constant and prolonged surveillance following the workers' announcement that they
were union organizers. 2 49 The Labor Board has even sustained an
unfair labor practice complaint where a company discharged a
supervisor who refused to engage in impermissible surveillance.2 5 0
In exercising their pervasive supervisory authority, therefore, employers must be careful not to infringe upon the NLRA prerogatives of their workers.
B.

Use of Undercover Informants

Employers frequently obtain crucial evidence from an alleged
offender's fellow workers. 25 1 A knowledgeable employee may voluntarily provide the information, or the company may actively seek
245 See United States Steel Corp., 49 Lab. Arb. 101 (1967) (Dybeck, Arb.); Central Soya
Co., 63-2 Lab. Arb. Awards
8582, at 4919-20 (1963) (Witney, Arb.). See also Du Mont
Laboratories, 44 Lab. Arb. 1143, 1145-46, 1149-50 (1965) (Wildebush, Arb.) (union may
challenge hidden agents' ability to observe relevant occurences).
246 See National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 62 Lab. Arb. 338 (1974) (Geissinger, Arb.).
247 See, e.g., Two Wheel Corp. dlb/a Honda of Mineola, 218 N.L.R.B. 486, 486, 89
L.R.R.M. 1405, 1406 (1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1976) (no opinion); J.C. Penney
Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 313, 317-18, 85 L.R.R.M. 1362, 1363 (1974); Peerless of America, Inc.,
198 N.L.R.B. 982, 983, 81 L.R.R.M. 1472, 1474-75 (1972), modified, 484 F.2d 1108 (7th
Cir. 1973); Randall's, 157 N.L.R.B. 86, 88-92, 61 L.R.R.M. 1323, 1323 (1966). See also Food
Store Employees Local 347 v. NLRB, 422 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
248
See, e.g., Taylor-Rose Mfg. Corp., 205 N.L.R.B. 262, 84 L.R.R.M. 1017 (1973),
enforced, 493 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir. 1974). See notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra.
249See, e.g., Florida Steel Corp., 215 N.L.R.B. 97, 98, 88 L.R.R.M. 1266, 1268 (1974),
enforced, 536 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1976) (no opinion).
250
See Elder-Beerman Stores Corp., 173 N.L.R.B. 566, 69 L.R.R.M. 1460 (1968),
enforced, 415 F.2d 1375 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970). The Board so
held even though § 2(3) of the NLRA (29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970)) expressly excludes supervisors from the definition of "employee."
251 To avoid the friction that develops when employees testify against each other,
many companies endeavor to obtain sufficient independent corroborative evidence to preclude having to call a rank-and-file member as a witness. See notes 260-63 and accompanying text infra.
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such assistance as part of its overall security program. This practice
ordinarily creates no difficulty for labor arbitrators, 25 2 and NLRA
problems are avoided as long as management solicits information
that pertains only to improper work activities. However, if the
company inquires about protected conduct of employees, unfair
labor practice liability will usually result. 2 53
Some employers attempt to secure a direct source of information by hiring undercover security agents to pose as regular employees. Arbitrators generally recognize the right of management
to utilize such tactics despite their unsavory aspects, 254 and will
usually give due consideration to evidence so derived.2 5 5 Although
the practice may create a counterproductive mistrust among the
employees, workers must learn to accept the notion that their
purported comrades may well be management informants who
will disclose any misconduct that comes to their attention. 25 6 Furthermore, no NLRA problems will arise unless informants are encouraged to report upon the statutorily protected conduct of the
workers.

25 7

Some employers utilize undercover spotters to review the work
performance of their employees by posing as ordinary customers.
Although this procedure may precipitate some paranoia among the
workers, 258 arbitrators regard it as an appropriate security tech-

nique. 25 9 However, the tactic does create a rather unique dilemma
252

But cf. Douglas Aircraft Co., 28 Lab. Arb. 198, 203-04 (1957) (Jones, Arb.) (company
unsuccessfully attempted to exclude grievant from hearing during critical testimony of fellow employees).
253 See, e.g., M. R. & R. Trucking Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 1109, 1112-15, 89 L.R.R.M. 1489,
1490 (1975); Poloron Prods. of Miss., Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 704, 707, 89 L.R.R.M. 1174, 1175
(1975); Liberty Homes, Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. 1102, 89 L.R.R.M. 1062 (1975).
254 See Bibi Continental Corp., 57 Lab. Arb. 1250, 1251 (1972) (Berkowitz, Arb.). See
also Donner, Political Intelligence: Cameras, Informers and Files, in RoscoE POUND-AMERICAN
TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, PRIVACY IN A FREE SOCIETY 56, 63-64 (1974).
255 See Inland Steel Container Co., 60 Lab. Arb. 536 (1973) (Marcus, Arb.); Bibi Continental Corp., 57 Lab. Arb. 1250 (1972) (Berkowitz, Arb.); Southern Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 43 Lab. Arb. 113 (1964) (Black, Arb.). But see Bamberger's, 59 Lab. Arb. 879 (1972)
(Glushien, Arb.) (company faced insurmountable hearsay problems when it did not call
undercover agent as a witness).
256 The Supreme Court has exhibited a similar attitude in the federal law enforcement
area by sustaining convictions achieved through the use of undercover agents despite
fourth amendment challenges. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301-03 (1966);
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211-12 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,
437-39 (1963).
2 57
See Altas Underwear Co., 18 N.L.R.B. 338, 342, 5 L.R.R.M. 398, 398 (1939), modified and enforced, 116 F.2d 1020 (6th Cir. 1941).
258 See, e.g., S. TERKEL, supra note 3, at 275-76.
2-9 See, e.g., Los Angeles Transit Lines, 27 Lab. Arb. 740, 741 (1955) (Hildebrand,
Arb.); Shenango Valley Transp. Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 362, 365 (1954) (Brecht, Arb.).
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for arbitrators. Since the usefulness of spotters depends upon their
continued anonymity, employers are often hesitant to produce
them as witnesses at arbitration hearings. Some arbitrators have
deferred to such concerns by relying on written reports prepared
by the spotters without requiring the testimony of the spotters
themselves. 260 Despite the grievant's inability to cross-examine, arbitrators have been willing to lend great credence to such reports,
since they are usually produced by professional investigators who
have no motive to lie. 6 1 Although this position is not unreasonable, other means should be explored to protect the interests of
management while simultaneously affording the accused employee the chance for meaningful cross-examination. A compromise approach might entail having the undercover investigator
testify before only the arbitrator, subject to his inquiries.2 6 2 Alternatively, the spotter could testify as a witness at the hearing behind
a screen which would preserve his anonymity. 263 By carefully regulating the questions propounded, the arbitrator could prevent the
unnecessary divulgence of professional investigative secrets.
C.

Surreptitious Photographicand EavesdroppingTechniques

1. In General
In recent years, technological developments have significantly
enhanced the ability to covertly observe and overhear the activities
of others. 2 64 Infrared devices permit photographs to be taken

through solid walls. 2 65 Miniature microphones and transmitters can
260 See, e.g., Los Angeles Transit Lines, 25 Lab. Arb. 740, 744-46 (1955) (Hildebrand,
Arb.); Shenango Valley Transp. Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 362, 364-65 (1954) (Brecht, Arb.).
26I See Los Angeles Transit Lines, 25 Lab. Arb. 740, 744-45 (1955) (Hildebrand, Arb.);

Shenango Valley Transp. Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 362, 365 (1954) (Brecht, Arb.).
2'62 See Fleming, Some Problems of Due Process and Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration, 13
STAN. L. REV. 235, 248 (1961).
26 See id. at 247-48; Carlson & Phillips, supra note 14, at 537.
264 Concealable movie and still cameras are available that are completely automa-

tic, that can be operated by remote control, and that are so sensitive to the presence of human beings that they take pictures only when people are near. Closedcircuit TV cameras have been reduced in size until today there is a camera smaller
than an ordinary flashlight. It can easily be concealed in air ducts or lighting
fixtures. Infrared light or electronic light simplifiers can be used to take pictures
even in the dark.
E. LONG, supra note 118, at 74-75. See A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 70-78. See generally A.
LEMOND & R. FRY, supra note 3, at 26-62; E. LONG, supra note 118, at 64-78; Spelfogel,
supra note 6, at 180-82.
265 A. LEMOND & R. FRY, supra note 3, at xii.
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be hidden in virtually any location.2 66 Directional microphones can
pick up conversations conducted a considerable distance away, and
microwave techniques permit eavesdropping even through thick
walls. 267 It is even possible to set up a system that monitors all of
the discussions occurring in an entire building, 268 and, through the
use of speech spectography, to identify all of the seemingly anon26 9
ymous speakers recorded.
Many private companies have decided to install such devices to
counter industrial depredations and to supervise more effectively
the work performance of their employees. 2 70 Although most employers use the equipment for bona fide business purposes,2 7 ' the
capacity for abuse must not be ignored.2 7 2 Labor organizations
have vociferously opposed the use of concealed surveillance devices
in the employment environment. 2 73 On several occasions, unions
have convinced management to stop using the devices, and in some
industries strike threats have successfully persuaded employers not
to install such equipment.2 7 4 Despite these efforts, however, employees are often covertly monitored.
Although authorities have appropriately recognized that an
employer's proprietary interests may justify using surveillance
techniques in production areas, stockrooms, loading zones, and
266 See A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 73-74.
26 7

See id. at 76-77.

268 See id. at 75.
26 9

See Kersta, Voiceprint Identification, 196 NATURE 1253 (1962); Tosi, Oyer, Lashbrook,
Pedrey, Nicol & Nash, Experiment on Voice Identification, 51 J. ACOUSTICAL Soc'Y OF AM.
2030 (1972). See also Kamine, The Voiceprint Technique: Its Structure and Reliability, 6 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 213 (1969); Comment, Voiceprints-The Admissibility Question: What Evidentiary
Standard Should Apply?, 19 ST. Louis L.J. 509 (1975); Comment, The Voiceprint Technique: A
Problem in Scientific Evidence, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1365 (1972).
270
See A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 105-07. Aggressive advertising campaigns conducted
by companies manufacturing and installing modern surveillance devices served to apprise
employers of their availability. See id. at 90-100. But see 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(c) (1970) (drastically limiting published advertising of devices designed for surreptitious interception of
wire and oral communications). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 51 2 (1)(a), (b), 2513 (1970).
271See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 1, at 30.
272 For example, several employers have installed hidden cameras and surreptitious
listening devices in employee washrooms and lounges. One even hid a microphone in the
toilet tissue container in the women's lavatory. See E. LONG, supra note 118, at 204, 207.
273 Ironically, however, labor unions have themselves frequently resorted to using such
devices for their own purposes. See A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 109.
274 See id. at 381-82. The fear of privacy invasions stemming from the use of sophisticated surveillance devices is not merely a recent phenomenon. See Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890). See also Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (dissenting opinion, Brandeis, J.).
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similar locations, they have logically favored reasonable limitations
27 5
on surveillance in areas where employees are entitled to privacy.
Areas such as lavatories and employee lounges should be free of
all monitoring equipment, concealed or otherwise. Surveillance
devices are inherently intrusive, whether or not they are openly
visible or known to exist by all employees. When subjected to inappropriate surveillance, workers should receive compensatory damages, and exemplary damages for malicious employer conduct, in
a tort action for invasion of privacy.2 76
2. Limitations Under Federal Wiretap Law
Federal law provides some protection against unwarranted
electronic and mechanical intrusions. Although Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968277 ("Title
III") does not cover photographic surveillance, 278 it does proscribe
most deliberate and surreptitious interceptions of wire and oral
communications. 2 79 "The Act was intended to deal with increasing
275 See A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 363. See also id. at 57. Cf. Note, Electronic Surveillance
and the Right of Privacy, 27 MONT. L. REV. 173 (1966) (suggesting adoption of statutory
controls).
276 The use of tort doctrines in this area would provide some protection for unorganized employees, who usually have no access to the grievance-arbitration process. See
note 23 supra. Organized workers would also benefit from the added protection.
277 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
275
See Sponick v. Detroit Police Dep't, 49 Mich. App. 162, 198, 211 N.W.2d 674, 690
(1973).
279 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who(a) willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person
to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire or oral communication;
(b) willfully uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or
endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any
oral communication when(i) such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a
wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or

(iii) such person knows, or has reason to know, that such device or any
component thereof has been sent through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iv) such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the premises of any
business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; ...
(c) willfully discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire or oral communication, knowing or having reason to know
that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral
communication in violation of this subsection; or
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threats to privacy resulting from the growing use of sophisticated
electronic devices ....

280

With two exceptions, 281 Title III forbids the interception of
telephonic communications by private employers. The first exception provides limited immunity for telephone companies.
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator
of a switchboard, or an officer, employee, or agent of any communication common carrier, whose facilities are used in the
transmission of a wire communication, to intercept, disclose, or
use that communication in the normal course of his employment
while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the
rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or
property of the carrier of such communication: Provided, That
said communication common carriers shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring
except for mechanical or service
282
checks.
control
quality
Although one view of this exemption might permit communication
common carriers to monitor calls in the hope of preventing theft of
company property, such an expansive interpretation is inappropriate. The exception should be construed narrowly to allow interceptions only where the carrier reasonably believes that particular
telephone conversations will pertain to the theft or destruction of
company property that is necessary to basic business functions. The
mere prospect of discovering unknown pilferers does not fall
within the exemption, since the statute restricts random monitor(d) willfully uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire or oral communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral communication in violation
of this subsection;
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
280 United States v. Carroll, 332 F. Supp. 1299, 1300 (D.D.C. 1971). Regarding the
vacillating and usually ineffective efforts by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches
of the federal and state governments to regulate electronic surveillance prior to Title III,
see A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 174-210, 330-64.
281 Where a privately operated, intra-company intercom system is involved, Tide III
would not be applicable since the definition of "wire communication" set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(1) (1970) covers only a "communication made in whole or in part through the use
of facilities . . . furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in
providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications." See United States v. Christman, 375 F. Supp. 1354, 1355 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
282 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (1970) (emphasis in original). See 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1970)
(statutory definition of "communication common carrier" adopted by reference in 18
U.S.C. § 2510(10) (1970)).
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ing solely to "mechanical or service quality control checks." Nor
should the provision "be construed as authorizing the use of
monitoring by a communications common carrier as a tool to en28 3
force intra-company rules.1
The second statutory exemption available to private employers
applies to both wire and oral communications.
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not
acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication where such person is a party to the communication or where
one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent
to such interception .... 284
Although a management official will rarely be a party to a confidential conversation pertaining to employment misconduct, he may
be able to obtain the consent of one of the parties before such a
conversation between others begins. Interception of the conversation under these circumstances would not violate Title 111.285
Nevertheless, obtaining general consent forms from employees for
this type of eavesdropping would be improper. Valid acquiescence
should be limited to a particular discussion or at least a series of
related communications.
Even if neither of the specific exemptions applies, management may still be able to intercept a non-telephonic verbal conversation without violating Title III. To be accorded statutory
protection, an "oral communication" must be "uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation. ' 28 6 This requirement has been interpreted to mean that, in
order to be shielded from eavesdropping, a party must (1) subjectively anticipate that his discussion will be confidential and (2)
283 Courtney, supra note 20, at 29.

284 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1970).
281

See Smith v. Cincinnati Post & Times-Star, 475 F.2d 740, 741 (6th Cir. 1973). The

employer has the burden of establishing that it had obtained the requisite consent prior to
the conversation in question. See United States v. McCann, 465 F.2d 147, 162 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 927 (1973). The fact that the consenting party believed that his
acquiescence would enhance the likelihood that any punishment imposed upon him as a
result of the misconduct in issue would thus be ameliorated would not ipso facto negate
the validity of his consent. Cf. United States v. Osser, 483 F.2d 727, 730 (3d Cir.) (motive
of potential government witness held not relevant if consent to wiretapping voluntary and
uncoerced), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1028 (1973).
28r 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1970).
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speak under circumstances warranting such a subjective expectation of privacy.2 8 7 If these two conditions precedent are not satisfied, an employer may covertly listen to a non-telephonic discussion without violating Title III.
If a company official intercepts a wire or oral communication
in violation of Title III, he is subject to a criminal penalty.2 8 8 In
addition, the parties to the intercepted conversation have two important remedies under the federal statute. 28 9 First, they can institute civil proceedings against the offending official and his employer seeking
(a) actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or
$1,000, whichever is higher;
(b) punitive damages; and
(c) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reason290
ably incurred.
Second, under section 2515 of Title III, the aggrieved parties can
force the suppression of any evidence obtained by their employer
in violation of the statute. 29 1 This suppression right applies to any
2 92
governmental hearing-federal or state, legal or administrative.
However, the exclusionary rule embodied in Title III generally does not apply in arbitration proceedings between private employers and employees. Section 2515 has no legal force in a non287

See United States v. Carroll, 337 F. Supp. 1260, 1262 (D.D.C. 1971) (objective test
for reasonable
expectation of privacy test approved).
2 88
See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(I) (1970), set out in note 279 supra.
289 A number of state legislatures have provided meaningful protection against wiretapping and covert electronic surveillance. See Black, Surveillance and the Labor Arbitration

Process, ARBITRATION

AND THE EXPANDING ROLE OF NEuTRALs

1, 11 (1970) (Proceedings of

the 23rd Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators); Note, Private Police
Forces: Legal Powers and Limitations, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 555, 566 (1971). A state may properly
impose stricter requirements than Title III. People v. Conklin, 12 Cal. 3d 259, 26873, 522 P.2d 1049, 1055-58, appeal dismissed sub nom. Conklin v. California, 419 U.S. 1064
(1974).
290 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970).
29x
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part

of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may
be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any
court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970).
292

See id.
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governmental forum, 2 93 and the traditional position of arbitrators
has been to allow the admission of surreptitiously obtained evidence. As one arbitrator succinctly stated, "the legality of the
means by which information has been gathered is for other authorities to determine," and the fact that evidence is obtained by
stealth does not preclude an arbitrator from relying on it to sustain
an employee's discharge. 294 My view is that this position is unduly
permissive, and may serve to defeat public policy. Where evidence
has been obtained in violation of Title III or state laws, arbitrators
should endorse the objectives behind these statutes by excluding
the illegally obtained information from arbitral consideration.2 9 5
To ensure that private employers who violate Title III do not
benefit from their overly intrusive behavior, Congress should
amend section 2515296 to cover nongovernmental adjudicatory
proceedings. Furthermore, Congress should extend Title III to
prohibit all surreptitious visual monitoring of employees under circumstances entitling them to a reasonable expectation of privacy.

293 Arguably, labor arbitration proceedings are conducted under the authority of federal or state law and should thus be covered by § 2515. Some courts initially recognized
that such hearings were authorized by the United States Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
(1970)). See, e.g., Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298,
301-03 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957). But see Street Employees Local
1210 v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 192 F.2d 310, 311-14 (3d Cir. 1951). However, the Arbitration Act expressly provides that "nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). This exclusionary language apparently led the Supreme Court to believe that the Arbitration Act did not apply
to labor arbitration hearings. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
466-69 (1957) (dissenting opinion, Frankfurter, J.) (majority opinion's "silent treatment" of
the Act in dispute over agreement to arbitrate indicates belief that Act did not apply). See
also R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD & D. ROTHSCHILD, COLLECTIvE BARGAINING AND LABOR
ARBITRATION 122 (1970).
Many states do have statutes pertaining to such proceedings. See generally D. ZISKIND,
LABOR ARBITRATION UNDER STATE STATUTES (1943). Although this fact could be used to

support the claim that the exclusionary doctrine specified in Tide III should be applied to
labor arbitration hearings, most courts would probably not accept this contention. The
mere fact that state law provides these proceedings with legal authenticity does not afortiori
convert private adjudications into governmental action within the meaning of § 2515, since
they are principally the creation of private collective bargaining agreements.
294 Sun Drug Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 191, 194 (1958) (Marcus, Arb.). See R. FLEMING, supra
note 54, at 190-91. See also Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 689, 695-96 (1965) (Smith,
Arb.).
295 R. FLEMING, supra note 54, at 193-94. Cf. Needham Packing Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 1057,
1095 (1965) (Davey, Arb.) (tapes made secretly by employer excluded).
296 See note 291 supra.
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3. Limitations Under the NLRA
The NLRA partially restricts the use of surveillance techniques
by employers. Although employers may use eavesdropping 297 and
photographic 298 devices to supervise work performance and to
control employee misconduct, they may not monitor employees'
protected conversations 29 9 or spy upon protected organizational
activities. 30 0 Moreover, since the use of such surveillance devices
has a significant impact upon working conditions, representative
labor organizations have the right to negotiate limitations on such
30 1
practices.
If the applicable collective bargaining agreement does not
specifically restrict the use of surveillance mechanisms, an employer may nevertheless be able to use some monitoring devices
under his inherent authority to supervise the employment environment. For example, an arbitrator has sustained the right of
management to install a visible closed-circuit television system covering the production area, where two regular supervisors suffered
from heart conditions that substantially impaired their ability to
monitor business operations. 30 2 Even in the absence of a recognized necessity, however, an employer may still be permitted to
297 See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 1122, 1125-26, 29 L.R.R.M.
1479,2 9 1480-81 (1952).
8 See, e.g., Franklin Stores Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. 52, 64-65, 81 L.R.R.M. 1650, 1650
(1972) (employer allowed to photograph union organizer in employer's store); MP Building Corp., 165 N.L.R.B. 829, 840, 65 L.R.R.M. 1581, 1581 (1967).
29 9
See, e.g., Flite Chief, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 1112, 1118-19, 1122, 90 L.R.R.M. 1616,
1617 (1975); Heights Funeral Home, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 723, 729, 62 L.R.R.M. 1415, 1415
(1966) (employer forbidden to claim use of surveillance measures even if not actually
used), enforced in pertinentpart, 385 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1967); International Trailer Co., 133
N.L.R.B. 1527, 1530, 1551-52, 49 L.R.R.M. 1054, 1057-58 (1961), enforced sub nom. NLRB
v. Gibraltar Indus., Inc., 307 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 911 (1963).
30 See, e.g., CBS Records Div., 223 N.L.R.B. 709, 91 L.R.R.M. 1564 (1976) (giving
impression of surveillance forbidden); Colonial Haven Nursing Home, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B.
1007, 1007, 89 L.R.R.M. 1595, 1596 (1975), enforced in pertinent part, 542 F.2d 691 (7th Cir.
1976); Elano Corp., 216 N.L.R.B. 691, 88 L.R.R.M. 1485 (1975).
101 See text accompanying notes 273-74 supra. See also note 139 supra; note 308 infra.
Although an employer might argue that a union should not be allowed to restrict its
use of sophisticated supervisory devices due to the proscription of § 8(b)(1)(B) of the Labor
Act (29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1970)), this contention should be rejected. That provision
prevents a labor organization from restraining an employer in the selection of its representatives for collective bargaining and the adjustment of grievances. Realistically it should be
regarded as only protecting the right of management to designate human representatives.
A mechanical surveillance device should certainly not be considered a "representative"
within the meaning of that provision.
302 See Cooper Carton Corp., 61 Lab. Arb. 697 (1973) (Kelliher, Arb.).
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maintain an observation system. Thus in one dispute the arbitrator
sanctioned the right of management to install television cameras to
improve the effectiveness of supervisory personnel. 30 3 "The use of
television to watch employees concerns the subject of supervision.
A decision as to how employees are to be supervised'and what are
the proper methods of supervision is a normal function of
Management.

' 30 4

Although the union strenuously maintained that

the system intruded upon worker privacy, the arbitrator rejected
this contention.
It should be evident that an employee's actions during working
hours are not private actions. Management is properly concerned
with the employee's work performance, what he does on the job
and whether he obeys the plant's rules and regulations ...
Surely, such supervision cannot be said to interfere with an
employee's right of privacy.... Regardless of the type of super-

vision (a camera, a supervisor, or both,) [sic] the employee works
with the knowledge that supervision may be watching him at any
time. He has a much better chance of knowing when he is being
watched where there is no camera.
But this is a difference in
05
3
degree, not a difference in kind.

Occasionally a labor union may- be able to prevent the use of
monitoring equipment even though there is no contractual provision limiting such devices. Since the installation of an electronic
monitoring system modifies existing employment conditions, a
general contract provision requiring management to preserve all
working conditions beneficial to the employees might preclude implementing such a plan. The right of workers to function without
the presence of television cameras is arguably an advantageous
30 6
condition of employment protected by this type of clause.
In the absence of an express maintenance-of-conditions provision, a union might argue that the lack of electronic monitoring
equipment constitutes an established past practice that has been
incorporated by implication into the negotiated agreement. 0 7
FMC Corp., 46 Lab. Arb. 335 (1966) (Mittenthal, Arb.).
/d. at 337. See Caproco, Inc., 56 Lab. Arb. 65, 66 (1971) (Larkin, Arb.). See also
Colonial Baking Co., 62 Lab. Arb. 586 (1974) (Elson, Arb.) (management allowed to install
closed-circuit television cameras as security measure).
305 FMC Corp., 46 Lab. Arb. 335, 338 (emphasis in original).
306 See EICO, Inc., 44 Lab. Arb. 563, 564 (1965) (Delany, Arb.). But cf. Atlanta Gas
Light Co., 59 Lab. Arb. 1026, 1038 (1972) (Mathews, Arb.) (installation of speed detection
equipment on trucks not a change in employment conditions).
307 Custom can, under some unusual circumstances, form an implied term of a
contract. Where the Company has always done a certain thing, and the matter is
3
304
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However, the fundamental right of a company to manage its business operations will normally take precedence over such a claim.
An employer clearly has the right to increase the number of its
supervisory personnel, regardless of established working conditions. That the added supervision comes from electronic devices
rather than human overseers is unlikely to alter this analysis for
most arbitrators. In both cases, lower levels of supervision in the
past were not the result of mutual understandings between labor
and management regarding working conditions. 308
The situation differs somewhat, however, where surreptitious
surveillance techniques are employed. When surveillance is overt,
employees are at least able to gauge the degree of privacy they
must forgo in the name of industrial efficiency. To the extent that
workers waive their privacy rights in such an employment setting,
they do so knowingly. This is not possible, however, where hidden
microphones and cameras are employed. The use of these devices
constitutes such an unconscionable affront to the personal dignity
and privacy of the workers that arbitrators should not sanction
their installation without express union acquiescence.

so well understood and taken for granted that it may be said that the Contract was
entered into upon the assumption that that customary action would continue to be
taken, such customary action may be an implied term.
Esso Standard Oil Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 73, 74 (1951) (McCoy, Arb.). See Metal Specialty Co.,
39 Lab. Arb. 1265, 1269 (1962) (Volz, Arb.); Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 191,
194-95 (1955) (Merrill, Arb.). See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 25, at
389-403.
308 [Tlhere are ... practices which are not the result of joint determination at all.
They may be mere happenstance, that is, methods that developed without design
or deliberation. Or they may be choices by Management in the exercise of managerial discretion as to the convenient methods at the time. In such cases there is
no thought of obligation or commitment for the future.
Ford Motor Co., 19 Lab. Arb. 237, 241-42 (1952) (Shulman, Arb.). See Federal Elec. Corp.,
54 Lab. Arb. 869, 871 (1970) (Updegraff, Arb.); FMC Corp., 46 Lab. Arb. 335, 336-37
(1966) (Mittenthal, Arb.).
Even though an employer's installation of an electronic surveillance system might not be
a breach of the applicable collective bargaining agreement, if the company acts without
giving the representative labor organization the opportunity to negotiate over the matter it
might violate § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970)) for failing to negotiate
over a mandatory subject for bargaining. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 (1962).
See also note 301 supra. However, the method of supervising the work environment is generally considered a basic managerial function. Therefore, if the contract contains a management prerogative clause recognizing the discretion of the employer to manage the
business, there would probably not be a violation if the company merely instituted a
mechanical monitoring system. Cf. LeRoy Machine Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431, 1432, 56
L.R.R.M. 1369, 1370 (1964) (union waived right to bargain on employee qualifications
under management prerogative clause).
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CONCLUSION

Several general principles emerge from the current framework of arbitral and statutory regulation of the inquisitorial process in private employment. Employers normally have the right to
interrogate employees about matters related to suspected employment misconduct, provided that the questioning does not impinge upon worker rights protected under the NLRA. Arbitrators
may not consider an employee's refusal to answer questions as
evidence of guilt concerning the suspected wrongdoing, although
the refusal itself may constitute an independent basis for discipline. 30 9 Employees have no right to assistance from a union representative during the initial stages of an investigation unless such
representation is required under the NLRA or the collective bargaining agreement and the employee does not waive the right.
Employers may conduct business-related searches or surveillance
within the plant, even though intrusive, as long as clearly defined
rules govern these procedures, and as long as the investigative
activity does not violate the collective bargaining agreement or
worker rights protected under the NLRA.
Arbitrators will accord probative value to most evidence material to a grievance, provided that the evidence was obtained pursuant to lawful, good faith security techniques undertaken by an
employer. Where the circumstances surrounding a search or interrogation suggest duress or trickery, however, arbitrators will give
the evidence little weight. Evidence obtained through gross acts of
coercion or deception, or pursuant to a clearly improper employer
search or interrogation, will be excluded altogether.
Current arbitral guidelines represent an approach toward accommodating conflicting interests that is receptive to many factors.
This approach should be extended to those remaining industrial
security problems that continue to be governed by inflexible rules
based on outmoded concepts. In each case, the need for industrial
security and efficiency must be balanced against the intrusiveness
of the security measure and the probative value of the evidence
obtained. Legislators can assist in this process by enacting statutory
protections for the individual rights that they deem most important. In the vast majority of cases, however, the arbitration process
is the preferable forum for balancing conflicting private interests
in the industrial context.
309 Note, however, that most arbitrators will not allow imposition of discipline for refusal to submit to a lie detector test. See note 187 and accompanying text supra.

